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Abstract
After briefly describing the essential mandates of the relevant EC directives, this Article dis-
cusses the novel-for-Italy independent regulatory commissions that are critical to the developing
competitive frameworks for electricity and telecommunication. It then reviews applicable sub-
stantive law for each of the electricity and telecommunication sectors, and offers examples of
how the independent regulatory commissions are working to shape competitive markets. Italy’s
independent regulatory commissions have resulted in a reorganization of its electric and telecom-
munication sectors quite different than that contemplated as recently as the early 1990s. Italy’s
creation of its new independent regulatory commissions, as well as the mixed experience of its
Law No. 9 of 1991 experiment with non-ENEL power plants have shaped: the initiatives that
ENEL’s own management has taken to restructure and reposition ENEL; recent regulation rela-
tive to restructuring of the electric sector as a whole; and the terms of the mandated break up of
ENEL. As for telecommunications, the acquisition of Telecom Italia - Italy’s former State-held
monopoly, via a hostile, bank-funded takeover - and the entrance of new players in the exploding
fields of cellular and fixed line telephony provide evidence that the new institutional arrangements
are beginning to produce the desired competitive markets.
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I. CONTRAST OF CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION AND PAST
DISMISSAL OF COMMUNITY LAW
In 1964, Italy's Constitutional Court summarily dismissed
European Community ("EC" or "Community") law. Today, It-
aly's independent regulatory authorities energetically are em-
bracing Community initiatives to favor competitive electricity
and telecommunication markets. This Article recounts the his-
tory of this reversal of position and illustrates its importance in
Italian economic and political life.
Alternative explanations of why Italy has come to embrace
Community law can be offered. One such explanation is that
Italy's lack of rooted identity as a nation state motivates its appar-
ent enthusiasm for all things European.1 The European Union
("EU") and Community law and institutions provide necessary
reinforcement of Italy's governmental institutions, while at the
same time nurturing the opportunities for regional diversity. 2
This Article's presentation of the evolution of Community law in
* Partner, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. Mr. Del Duca is a graduate of Harvard Law
School, Universit6 de Lyon (DEA), European University Institute (Ph.D), and the
UniversitA di Bologna, FacoltA di Giurisprudenza (laurea). Mr. Del Duca serves as ad-
junct professor at UCLA School of Law.
** Senior Associate, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. Mr. Mortillaro is a graduate of
the University of Miami School of Law, UCLA School of Law (LLM) and the UniversitA
di Milano, FacoltA di Giurisprudenza (laurea).
The authors thank the following for comments on the manuscript: Louis De Duca
(Dickinson School of Law-Pennsylvania State University); Yves Miedzianogora (Kelley
Drye & Warren LLP); and Arthur Rosett (UCLA School of Law).
1. G. Frederico Mancini, The Italians in Europe, FOREIGN Arr., Mar./Apr. 2000, at
122.
2. Id.
ITALY'S RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 537
Italy both confirms and contradicts this view. As confirmation, it
is unlikely that the innovation of independent regulatory author-
ities in Italy's electricity and telecommunication sectors would
have been actualized without the stimulus of Community policy
initiatives in favor of competitive markets. As contradiction, the
Italian judicial accommodation to Community law and the Ital-
ian adoption of the independent regulatory authority model, evi-
dence the capacity of Italian state institutions to innovate and
adapt to new realities and challenges.
The leadership of the Constitutional Court in successive
phases, and more recently the leadership of Italian regulatory
authorities, partly explains why Italy now largely embraces Com-
munity law. Another factor is the very success of the Common
Market. As Community barriers to trade have diminished, the
volume of the Community's internal market has grown, and
hence the pressures either to adhere to Community mandates or
be left behind has increased commensurately. The political and
economic acheivements of the Community's single market initia-
tive, the expansion of the Community to include additional
Member States, and the launch of the'European Monetary
Union, among other factors, have built momentum toward the
Italian embrace of Community law. The Cold War and the only-
recently broken political deadlock in Italy, which permanently
excluded a significant fraction of the electorate from participa-
tion in the national government, also contributed to Italy's re-
ceptiveness to Community initiatives. The evolution of these
events, and the progress of the Common Market, correspond
broadly to the transitions described in this Article on the focus
of the Community law-Italian law relationship in Italy. Initially,
the Constitutional Court arrogated all say relative to the relation-
ship of Community and Italian law to itself (and strictly limited
the role of Community law). In a subsequent phase, the Consti-
tutional Court allowed all Italian courts to address the relation-
ship within the framework of the general acceptance of Commu-
nity law established by the Constitutional Court. Thereafter, It-
aly's Parliament, via the La Pergola law and the creation of the
independent regulatory authorities with responsibility for imple-
menting Community mandates for competitive markets, made a
significant contribution. The independent regulatory authori-
ties are now the leading edge for the application of Community
law in Italy.
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Italy's current embrace of Community mandates for compe-
tition in the electricity and telecommunication sectors contrasts
sharply with its dismissal of Community law in connection with
the early 1960s creation of the national electric monopoly, Ente
nazionale per l'energia elettrica ("ENEL"). In 1964, decisions
associated with Costa v. ENEL, Italy's Constitutional Court3 and
the European Court of Justice (or "ECJ") 4 addressed questions
arising from the expropriations that created ENEL. The practi-
cal effect of the opinion of each court in Costa v. ENEL was to
allow the expropriations to proceed without disturbance from
Community law. The opinions of these two high courts, how-
ever, squarely contradicted each other on the important issue of
how Italian and Community law relate to each other.
At that time, Italy's Constitutional Court dismissed the rele-
vance of Community law while the European Court of Justice
asserted its supremacy. What happened was two high courts talk-
ing past each other. There was no mechanism for one court to
impose its holding on the other and no superior authority to
which to appeal. The Italian Constitutional Court's watershed
1984 Granital opinion5 reconciled the direct judicial conflict. It
did so by acknowledging the supremacy of Community over Ital-
ian law so long as Community law is consistent with "the funda-
mental principles of the [Italian] constitutional order and the
inalienable rights of the human being. "6
Granital is a milestone in how the Italian approach to Com-
munity law has changed. But, the evolution of the relations be-
tween Italian and Community law extends beyond judicial recon-
ciliation. The atmosphere of diffidence and confrontation has
receded from a much broader range of national institutions
than just the courts. Indeed, with respect to the restructuring of
the Italian electricity and telecommunication sectors, the institu-
tions at the forefront of the relationship have changed. No
longer are they defensive of their fundamental charters; rather,
they are independent regulatory commissions, known as "Au-
thorities." Their express mission is to implement Community
3. Costa v. ENEL, Corte cost., Mar. 9, 1964, n.14, 19 Racc. uff. corte cost. 131
(1964), 1964 Giur. Cost. 129.
4. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 592, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
5. Granital S.p.A. v. Amministrazione finanziaria, Corte Cost., June 8, 1984, n.170,
66 Racc. uff. corte cost. 367 (1984), 1984 Giur. Cost. 1988.
6. Granital S.p.A., 1984 Giur. Cost. at 1116.
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mandates in favor of competitive markets. In the combative days
of the Costa decisions, such institutions as the Authorities simply
did not exist.
EC directives7 are driving the restructuring now to create
competitive markets in Italy's electricity and telecommunication
sectors. The Italian response to the present Community man-
dates for competitive markets in these sectors demonstrates insti-
tutional innovation and maturation relative to the situation a
generation ago. In contrast to the peripheral role of Commu-
nity law during the period of ENEL's formation, Italy has created
new institutions-independent regulatory commissions-specifi-
cally to effect the reorganization of its electric and telecommuni-
cation sectors as required by current Community directives in
order to facilitate competition. These independent regulatory
commissions have the independence and resources required to
embrace and implement effectively the Community require-
ments for creation of competitive markets in these sectors. This
Article describes Italy's independent regulatory commissions as
relevant institutional innovations that go beyond the 1984 Italian
judicial accommodation to Community law, and offers them as
an illustration of the maturation of Italy's in relation to EC law.
A brief description of the early 1960s clash of Italian and
European courts associated with ENEL's creation as the national
electricity monopoly will serve as a baseline for assessing how far
Italy's relationship with Community law has evolved. This Article
then describes the Law No. 9 of 1991 framework,8 which re-
quired ENEL to purchase the electricity produced from quali-
fied new, non-ENEL plants in Italy at favorable prices. This law
established a dent in ENEL's integrated national electric monop-
oly, although it did not create a competitive framework for the
supply of electricity. Rather, it promoted the development of a
limited number of new power plants based on State concessions
that, in conformity with a thinly veiled mercantilist philosophy,
7. Electricity: European Parliament and Council Directive No. 92/96, O.J. L 27/
70 (Jan. 30, 1997). Telecommunications: Commission Directive No. 301/88 O.J. L
131/73 (1988); Council Directive No. 387/90, O.J. L 192/1 (1990); Commission Direc-
tive No. 90/388, OJ. L 192/10 (1990); Commission Directive No. 46/94, O.J. L 268/15
(1994); Commission Directive No. 95/51, OJ. L 256/49 (1995); Commission Directive
No. 19/96, O.J. L 74/13 (1996).
8. Law No. 9 ofJanuary 9, 1991 (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 13 (Jan. 16, 1991)
(containing rules for implementation of new national energy plan, including institu-
tional aspects, and hydroelectric, geothermal, self production, and tax provisions).
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assured returns without market risk to the new plants' owners.
Nonetheless, it opened the generation of electricity to a new
field of market operators. The regulatory framework for realiz-
ing a power plant based on Law No. 9 of 1991 has been in con-
stant evolution. The Byzantine detail of this evolution provides
added perspective on how radically the new independent regula-
tory commissions effected cultural reform through maintenance
of market principles. The framework of Law No. 9 of 1991 was
far from a competitive model. It, nevertheless, helped to pre-
pare the way for acceptance in Italy of the current Community
mandate to restructure the electric sector and to allow a substan-
tial measure of true competition.
The EC directives of the last decade on liberalization of the
electricity and telecommunication sectors specify in some detail
both the permissible structures of national electric and telecom-
munication markets and the principles to be respected in their
operation. This Article reviews Italy's substantial initiative to im-
plement the mandates of these directives.'
After briefly describing the essential mandates of the rele-
vant EC directives, this Article discusses the novel-for-Italy in-
dependent regulatory commissions that are critical to the devel-
oping competitive frameworks for electricity and telecommuni-
cation. It then reviews applicable substantive law for each of the
electricity and telecommunication sectors, and offers examples
of how the independent regulatory commissions are working to
shape competitive markets. Italy's independent regulatory com-
missions have resulted in a reorganization of its electric and tele-
communication sectors quite different than that contemplated
as recently as the early 1990s. Italy's creation of its new in-
dependent regulatory commissions, as well as the mixed experi-
ence of its Law No. 9 of 1991 experiment with non-ENEL power
plants have shaped:
9. For an overview of European Community ("EC or Community") liberalization
initiatives relative to electricity, energy, telecommunications, and other fields such as
railroads, air transport, andairports by the director of the research department of It-
aly's Antitrust Authority, see Alberto Heimler, Competition and Regulation in Public
Utilities, Paper Delivered Before the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Orgnization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Advisory Group on Privatization,
(Sept. 17, 1998), <http://www.oecd.org//daf/corporate-affairs/privatisation/competi-
tion/heimler.pdf> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal).
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* the initiatives that ENEL's own management has taken
to restructure and reposition ENEL;
" recent regulation relative to restructuring of the electric
sector as a whole; and
" the terms of the mandated break up of ENEL.
As for telecommunications, the acquisition of Telecom Italia-
Italy's former State-held monopoly, via a hostile, bank-funded
takeover-and the entrance of new players in the exploding
fields of cellular and fixed line telephony provide evidence that
the new institutional arrangements are beginning to produce
the desired competitive markets.
II. EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO
COMMUNITY LAW
A. Birth of Italy's National Electric Monopoly (ENEL): Clash
Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the European
Court of Justice
Current developments in both the electric and telecommu-
nication sectors illustrate the maturation of Italy's response to
Community law.10 As to both sectors, Community law had no
significant affirmative application in the Community's early
years.
When the Treaty of Rome took effect in 1957, Italy's tele-
communication system existed as a government enterprise asso-
ciated with the postal service. It therefore fell within the Treaty
of Rome Article 90(2) (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 86(2)) ex-
emption for State monopolies.11 Accordingly, it was not a focus
10. For highlights of various aspects of Italy's current posture relative to EC law, as
well as a review of the fundamental elements of EC law, see PAOLO MENGOZZi, EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY LAw: FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (Pat-
rick Del Duca trans., Kluwer, 1999). Note that Mr. Mengozzi is now an Italian member
of European Court of First Instance. For an overview of the Italian legal system, see
Louis Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, The Italian Legal System: Adapting to the Needs of a
Dynamic Society, 3 NAT'L IT. AM. L.J. 1 (1995).
11. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 90(2), Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 50 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Consolidated version of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, art. 86(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 210 (1997), 37
I.L.M. 79, 94 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty
of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1, (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"),
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of Community law attention until the recent telecommunication
sector liberalization directives.
Italy's electric sector has a very different history. This his-
tory contrasts dramatically with the current collaborative ap-
proach to Community law. As of the late 1950s, a plethora of
small and medium size electric companies, with sometimes over-
lapping service territories and operating at a variety of frequen-
cies and voltages, generated and distributed Italy's electricity. 12
ENEL's creation, in the early 1960s through the nationalization
of the mosaic of public and private electric companies that previ-
ously existed in Italy,i s was meant to achieve economies of scale.
Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of
TEU and EC Treaty). Article 86(2) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community ("Consolidated EC Treaty"), following the spirit of Arti-
cle 90(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC
Treaty"), provides:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on com-
petition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the per-
formance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The de-
velopment of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be con-
trary to the interests of the Community.
In Italy, until the early 1990s, the Mails and Telecommunications Ministry controlled
telecommunications as a monopoly. See GUIDo CERVIGNI, ET AL., MONOPOLIO E CONCOR-
RENZA NELLE TELECOMUNICAZIONI-IL CASO OMNITEL (II Sole 24 Ore S.p.A. 1998). It
did so through Societ Italiana per i Servizi Telefonici ("SIP"), a corporation controlled
by the Italian Treasury Ministry through the government industrial holding company
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale ("IRI"). CERVIGNI supra, at 54. Law No. 71 of
January 29, 1994 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 24 (Jan. 31, 1994) created the framework for the
privatization of Telecom Italia.
12. AMENDMENT No. 3 TO FORM F-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE U.S. SE-
CURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1933, filed by ENEL S.p.A. WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Registration No. 333-10944, 52 (Oct. 28, 1999) [hereinafter
ENEL PROSPECTUS].
13. See Italie, in ENERGY SuRv'-K ' INDICATORS BY COUNTRY 61, OECD, (visited
on Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [translation from French by authors]. This states that:
On the eve of the 1962 nationalization, the electric energy market was charac-
terized by the presence of four categories of operators: national or regional
industrial and financial groups (such as Edison, SIP, Adriatica, Centrale, SME,
SocietA Elettrica Sicilia, and SocietA Elettrica Sardegna), industrial enterprises
who produced for their own needs ('auto-producers'), 'small' enterprises
(with a production of less than 15 million Kwh per year) and electric enter-
prises of local governments ('municipal enterprises')."
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Since then, ENEL has been Italy's national electric utility and
until recently was wholly owned by the Italian Treasury Minis-
try.14 It has been responsible for the bulk of generation, trans-
mission, and retail distribution of electricity in Italy.1 5
A 1962 law 6 mandated the expropriation of approximately
1250 companies,17 which were collapsed into one entity to create
ENEL. The law declared that:
for purposes of general utility the national Entity [ENEL] will
provide for the coordinated utilization and the upgrading of
the installations, for purposes of assuring with minimum costs
of management an availability of electric energy adequate in
quantity and price to the requirements of a balanced eco-
nomic development of the Country."
The law provided compensation at market rates for the enter-
prises expropriated, payable in installments over a decade, with
the opportunity for expropriated parties to make first an admin-
istrative appeal to a specially created commission, and then re-
course to the ordinary civil and administrative courts.1 9
The litigation of lasting significance 21 triggered by the wide-
ranging expropriation arose from an Italian court of quite mod-
est jurisdiction and questioned its constitutionality. The issues
of Italian constitutional law related to the consistency of the ex-
propriation with provisions of the Italian constitution, however,
were readily resolved by the Italian Constitutional Court in favor
of the expropriations. The European Court of Justice's declara-
tion as to the significance of EC law was the element of the litiga-
tion that has had lasting resonance beyond the specific instance
of ENEL's creation.
Among the many individuals affected by the expropriations,
14. Law No. 333 ofJuly 11, 1992, art. 15 (It.) (concerning transformation of ENEL
into joint stock private law company and converted into law with modifications by Law
No. 359 of August 8, 1992 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 190 (July 13, 1992)).
15. In 1998 ENEL generated 73% of the electricity produced in Italy and distrib-
uted 93% of the electricity sold to final consumers. ENEL PROSPECTUS, supra note 12, at
5. ENEL's 1998 revenues were approximately US$21.3 billion, with a net income of
approximately US$2.3 billion. Id.
16. Law No. 1643 of December 6, 1962 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 316 (Dec. 12, 1962).
17. ENEL PROSPECTUS supra note 12, at 50.
18. Law No. 1643 of 1962, art. 1, 3.
19. Id. arts. 5, 6.
20. For a full, current discussion of the exchange between the European Court of
Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court and the present status of the Constitutional
Court's relevant jurisprudence, see MENGOZZI, supra note 10, at 93-112.
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one Milan lawyer, 21 Flaminio Costa, took legal action. He initi-
ated proceedings before a justice of the peace (or "giudice con-
ciliatore") in Milan in his capacities as a shareholder of an expro-
priated company and as an electricity consumer.22 The giudice
conciliatore's jurisdiction can be thought of as similar to that of a
justice of the peace, i.e., the giudice conciliatore had jurisdiction
over small matters and was not required to have extensive legal
training. Mr. Costa initiated the proceeding to claim that he was
not obligated to pay an invoice from ENEL in the minimal
amount of 1925 lire (at that time less than US$5) .23 The giudice
conciliatore stayed the initial proceeding so as to refer questions
of Italian constitutional law to Italy's Constitutional Court for a
determination as to whether the 1962 law creating ENEL and
related measures was consistent with the Italian constitution.2 4
Thereafter, Mr. Costa appears to have initiated a second pro-
ceeding that raised substantially the same issues, and in that pro-
ceeding the giudice conciliatore referred questions of EC law to the
ECJ. 25 The Italian Constitutional Court rendered its opinion on
the questions posed to it first, and then the ECJ responded to its
own referral from the giudice conciliatore with a necessarily indi-
rect, but strong and politically astute message to Italian authori-
ties, including the Italian Constitutional Court.
1. Italian Constitutional Court's Costa Decision-A Dualist View
of Community and Italian Legal Systems
In its opinion, the Italian Constitutional Court summarily
disposed of the Italian constitutional questions related to the
conformity with the Italian constitution of the 1962 law that
mandated the expropriations to create ENEL as a national mo-
21. Opinion of Advocate LaGrange, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585,
600, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 436.
22. Id. at 588, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 426.
23. Id. at 600, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 436.
24. See COST. art. 134 (It.). Article 134 of the Italian Constitution provides, in rele-
vant part, that "[t]he Constitutional Court shall decide: disputes concerning the consti-
tutional legitimacy of laws and acts having the force of law, adopted by the State and the
Regions..." Constitutional Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 43 (Feb.
20, 1948), and Law No. 87 of March 11, 1953, Gazz. Uff. No. 62 (Mar. 14, 1953) provide
the mechanism for referral by any judge of a relevant question of constitutionality to
the Constitutional Court and the suspension of the underlying proceeding pending the
Constitutional Court's answer.
25. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 Giur. cost. 129, 150; Opinion of Advocate LaGrange,
Flaminio Costa, [1964] E.C.R. at 601, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 437.
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nopoly. The Italian Constitutional Court held that the asserted
claim of party influence over legislators who enacted the law did
not violate the constitutional mandate for their freedom from
undue influence. 26 As to the claim that the expropriation was
not duly founded on grounds of "general utility" as the Constitu-
tion required, the court deferred to Parliament as having the
ability to make the appropriate judgment.2v The court found
that in connection with the government's adoption of decrees to
implement the 1962 law, there was no improper delegation of
lawmaking authority by Parliament.28 The court dodged on pro-
cedural grounds the disparity of treatment claim relative to the
exemption of various categories of enterprises from the expro-
priations.29
In the face of the Italian Constitutional Court's blunt rejec-
tion of the EC law claims, the ECJ made strong statement as to
the significance of Community law. The Italian Constitutional
Court determined that it had no need to consider any issue of
Community law, observing that:
because there must remain firm the rule of laws subsequent
to [the Italian law of execution of the treaty], according to
principles of succession of laws in time, it derives that every
hypothesis of conflict between the one [the law of execution
of the treaty] and the others [subsequent national laws] can-
not give rise to questions of constitutionality.3"
The Italian Constitutional Court's analysis behind this conclu-
sion is that Italy adhered to the Treaty of Rome by adopting an
ordinary law in reliance upon its constitutional provision in Arti-
cle 11 for its membership in international organizations. 31 The
court specifically observed that the signing of a treaty by which
26. Costa, 1964 Giur. Cost. at 156 (referencing Article 67 of Italian Constitution).
27. Id. at 159 (concerning Article 43 of Italian Constitution).
28. Id. (concerning Articles 4 and 41 of Italian Constitution).
29. Id. Article 3 of the Italian Constitution provides for equality of treatment.
30. Id. at 160.
31. CosT. art. 11 (It.). Article 11 of the Italian Constitution provides:
Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression against the liberties of
other people and as a means for settling international disputes; it agrees, on
conditions of equality with other states, to such limitation of sovereignty as
may be necessary for a system calculated to ensure peace and justice between
nations; it shall promote and encourage international organizations having
such ends in view.
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limitations of sovereignty were assumed: "does not imply any
deviation from the rules in force concerning the effectiveness in
internal law of the obligations assumed by the State in the rela-
tions with other States." 32
These observations represent a dualist conception of the re-
lation between Community and national law, whereby national
law permits Community law to have effect only to the extent con-
sistent with national law, in contrast to a monist notion of Com-
munity law supremacy over national law.
2. European Court of Justice's Costa Decision-A Monist View
of the Community/Italian Legal System
Consistent with standard practice, the ECJ's published deci-
sion ofJuly 15, 1964 was accompanied by the court's summary of
the underlying facts and of the parties' arguments, plus a prelim-
inary opinion by its Advocate General, which the court largely
followed. The case reached the ECJ through a Treaty of Rome
Article 177 (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 234) 33 referral of a
question of European Community law to the Court by the Milan
giudice conciliatore. The giudice conciliatore's questioned whether
the 1962 law providing for the creation of ENEL was consistent
with various articles of the Treaty of Rome, discussed below. The
Italian Constitutional Court had determined that it did not need
to reach this issue because of the supremacy of Italian law.
The ECJ followed a practice characteristic of many of its
opinions. It made a strong statement on matters that required
limited immediate national response.34 In the instant case, it
used a procedural question to enunciate a strong declaration of
the supremacy of Community law. At the same time, it ruled on
substantive matters in such a way as to declare the self-executing
nature of several Treaty of Rome provisions, without actually
having to impose any specific obligation on the judge or the par-
ties in the national legal proceeding that gave rise to the pro-
ceeding before the European Court ofJustice. This political ap-
proach by the ECJ is part of why Community law had such little
direct impact on the formation of ENEL, even though the litiga-
32. Costa, 1964 Giur. Cost. at 160.
33. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 234, O.J. C 340/3, at 273-74 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex
Article 177).
34. See MENGOZZI, supra note 10, at 115.
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tion associated with ENEL's creation articulated the fundamen-
tal principle of Community law supremacy.
As a preliminary matter, the Italian government argued on
several grounds that the giudice conciliatore had improperly posed
the question to the ECJ. These grounds included the following:
(1) the ECJ had been asked to declare national law invalid, an
act beyond its jurisdiction; (2) the question raised was not neces-
sary to resolution of the case before the giudice conciliatore; and
(3) the giudice conciliatore was restricted to application of Italian
law.
The ECJ dismissed each of these grounds, and relative to
the last one, made a strong statement on the supremacy of Com-
munity law. It stated:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity
and capacity of representation on the international plane
and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limita-
tion of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to
the Community, the Member States have limited their sover-
eign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created
a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves. 35
The court went on to state that "[t]he transfer by the States from
their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the
rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail."36
The balance of the opinion following these substantive affir-
mations was anticlimactic relative to the fundamental point of
Community law supremacy. The ECJ found that three of the
four treaty provisions cited in the referring question could not
be invoked by the plaintiff in the underlying action and that the
judge referring the question needed to undertake factual analy-
sis relative to the application of the remaining provisions, as fol-
lows:
* Treaty of Rome Article 102 (Treaty of Amsterdam, Arti-
cle 97) required a Member State to consult with the Eu-
35. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 455.
36. Id. at 594, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 456.
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ropean Economic Community Commission when "there
is reason to fear" "distortion of competition" from a
Member State action. The ECJ found that this obliga-
tion gave rise to no individual right of action;
" Treaty of Rome Article 93 (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article
88) concerned the requirement of advance notice to the
Commission of state aid to national industry and the
prohibition on new state aid. The ECJ found in the in-
stant case that there was no obligation giving rise to an
individual right of action;
3 7
" Treaty of Rome Article 53 (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article
44) prohibited introducing restrictions on rights of es-
tablishment of nationals of other Member States. The
ECJ found that this Treaty provision created individual
rights that national courts were required to protect. It
found, however, that the prohibition was satisfied be-
cause the same prohibitions on establishment of busi-
ness activity in the electric sector applied equally to na-
tionals of other Member States as to those of Italy;
" Treaty of Rome Articles 37(1) and (2) (Treaty of Amster-
dam, Articles 31(1) and (2)) concerned the require-
ments, respectively, of adjustment of "State monopolies
of a commercial character" to avoid discrimination in
the terms of procurement and marketing among nation-
als of various Member States, and prohibition against in-
troducing any new measure incompatible with Article
37(1). In each instance relative to Articles 37(1) and (2)
(Treaty of Amsterdam, Articles 31(1) and (2)), the ECJ
found that these provisions created individuals rights
that national courts must protect, while leaving their fac-
tual assessment to the referring judge.
37. More recent case law and EC texts are favorable to private actor challenges of
state aids. See Syndicat Franoais de l'Express International (SFEI) and Others v. La
Poste and Others, Case C-39/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3547, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 369 (af-
firming that acceptance by economic operator of unlawful assistance could damage
other economic operators and create cause of action under national law); Council Reg-
ulation No. 659/99, O.J. L 83/1 (1999); Commission Communication, O.J. C 318/3
(1983). In the Communication, the Commission stated:
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3. Judicial Accommodation via the Italian Constitutional
Court's Granital Decision-A Moderated Dualist View
In 1984, the Italian Constitutional Court enunciated an ac-
commodation of Italian and EC law."8 As previously mentioned,
in its Granital decision the Italian Constitutional Court accepted
the supremacy of Community law insofar as fundamental princi-
ples of the Italian constitutional system and human rights are
concerned. The evolution of the court's view on this topic to
one more accepting of Community law is of great significance in
relation to the Member State and Community law. This decision
ended the direct clash of the monist and dualist views which,
respectively, the ECJ and the Italian Constitutional Court first
expressed in the litigation arising from the nationalizations that
created ENEL, and which remained largely unreconciled for
some two decades.39
Both the ECJ's 1964 declaration of the principle of Commu-
nity law supremacy and the Italian Constitutional Court's accept-
ance, albeit with the noted limitations, of this principle in 1984
are important elements of the current Italian response to Com-
munity law. The legal principles litigated in those matters were
fundamental to the relationship between Community and Mem-
ber State law. However, the underlying fact of the 1960s expro-
priation of the myriad of local electric companies in Italy and
their fusion into a national monopoly was accomplished with
only the most peripheral attention by Italian authorities to Com-
The Commission therefore wishes to inform potential recipients of State aid of
the risk attaching to any aid granted them illegally, in that any recipient of an
aid granted illegally, i.e. without the Commission having reached a final deci-
sion, may have to refund the aid. Whenever it becomes aware that aid meas-
ures have been adopted by a Member State without the obligations under Arti-
cle 93(3) having been fulfilled, the Commission will publish a specific notice
in the Official Journal warning potential aid recipients of the risk involved.
The Commission also wishes to point out that the Court stated in its judgment
of 19 June 1973 in Case 77/72 that 'in respect of plans to grant new aids or
alter existing aids, the last sentence of Article 93(3) lays down procedural cri-
teria amenable to assessments by the national courts'.
38. Granital S.p.A. v. Amministrazione finanziaria, Corte cost.,June 8, 1984, n.170,
66 Racc. uff. corte cost. 367 (1984), 1984 Giur. Cost. 1988.
39. Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, New International Law in National Sys-
tems: Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 Am. J. INr'L L. 598
(1985). The monist view is that Community law rests at the apex of one's legal system
and subsumes national law. The dualist view is that Community and national law coex-
ist as separate legal systems and that national law controls the extent where Community
law is applicable.
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munity law concerns. During the 1960s expropriations and crea-
tion of the national electric monopoly, the relationship between
Italian and EC actors was limited to separate Italian and EC
court proceedings and led to conflicting rules of law. The Ital-
ian Constitutional Court's Granital decision, however, allows all
Italian courts to recognize the supremacy of Community law. It
has not been a substitute for the further legal innovation associ-
ated with Italy's creation of independent regulatory commis-
sions. Having autonomous regulators with resources and exper-
tise represents an institutional innovation that implements Com-
munity law further than judicial action alone.
B. La Pergola Law-Systematic Legislative Update of Community
Law Compliance
Subsequent to Granital, attention turned to the challenge of
Italy's chronic failure to implement EC directives through na-
tional legislative action.4 ° The so-called La Pergola law, Law
No. 86 of 1989,41 institutionalized a practice pursuant to which
the government proposed to Parliament each year approval of a
law that delegates to the government cabinet power to imple-
ment by decree the requirements of EC law. Institutionalization
of this practice removed Italy from the bottom of the rankings
relative to adoption of national measures to implement Commu-
nity requirements.42
Nonetheless, delay certainly remains possible. The Bersani
Decree 43 concerning the current reorganization of Italy's elec-
tric sector was adopted pursuant to this practice, specifically pur-
40. Sixth Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring
of the Application of Community Law, 1988, COM (89) 411 Final (Dec. 1989). Be-
tween 1981 and 1988, Italy was the object of 142 references by the Commission to the
ECJ for infringement of Community law obligations. Belgium and France were in sec-
ond and third places with 80 and 79 referrals respectively during the same period. Id.
at 29, tbl. 1.
41. Law No. 86 of March 9, 1989, (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 58 (Mar. 10, 1989). See
MENGOZZI, supra note 10, at 143, 145.
42. As of November 29, 1999, the leading Member State target of Community pro-
ceedings for infringement of Community requirements was France, with 274 proceed-
ings pending against it. Italy was in second place, with 202 proceedings. Denmark, with
53 proceedings pending against it, appeared the most compliant. See XVIth Report on
Monitoring the Application of Community Law, COM (99) 301 Final (July 1999) [here-
inafter XVIth Community Law Report].
43. Legislative Decree No. 79 of March 16, 1999 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 79 (Mar. 31,
1999) [hereinafter Bersani Decree].
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suant to the legislative delegation of Italian Law No. 128 of
1998."4 Law No. 128 of 1998 was the annual delegation of power
to Italy's government to implement EC directives. Even with the
benefit of this procedure, Italy breached for about two months
the February 19, 1999 deadline set by the relevant Community
directive for adoption of national implementation measures.45
This period, however, was short enough that no eligible party
made recourse to the procedures to seek condemnation of Italy
in the ECJ.46
It is also noteworthy that the fundamental text for restruc-
turing Italy's electric sector, the Bersani Decree, was adopted
pursuant to an annual legislative delegation to update national
compliance with Community law and not via regulatory action
on the part of Italy's independent regulatory commissions, spe-
cifically the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas. This fact un-
derlines that the institutional innovation of independent regula-
tory commissions does not by itself generate the fundamental
structural reform in favor of competition. As the Bersani De-
cree's adoption demonstrates relative to the electric sector, the
independent regulatory commissions are part of a broader
evolution that favors Community law over national institutions.
C. Non-ENEL Power Plants as Precursors to Competition: The Law
No. 9 of 1991 Experiment
At the same time that the now outmoded concept of a sim-
ple sale of ENEL's shares dominated the thinking of electric sec-
tor reform, Italy copied an element of the U.S. regulatory frame-
work to promote the creation of power plants not owned by
ENEL. The U.S. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197847
("PURPA") established that: (1) U.S. electric utilities must
purchase electricity from so-called independent power plants,
i.e., power plants not owned by electric utilities, and (2) such
electric utilities must pay the marginal avoided cost of such elec-
tricity, i.e., the marginal cost that the electric utilities avoided by
44. Law No. 128 of April 24, 1998 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 104 (May 7, 1998).
45. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 92/96, O.J. L 27/70-79
(1997).
46. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 230, O.J. C 340/3, at 272, 37 I.L.M.
at 125 (ex Article 173).
47. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978).
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not having to provide their own power plants to generate the
electricity. Italy's Law No. 9 of 1991 embraced these two con-
cepts.4" Just as in the United States, it took several years for the
regulatory issues posed by PURPA to be resolved to the point
that financing and construction of PURPA power plants could
begin, so too in Italy it was several years before a first wave of
independent power projects began to come to fruition.
Italian regulation locked in the marginal avoided cost not
incurred by ENEL for the electric energy generated by such
plants at a time when oil prices and ENEL's generating costs
were high.4 9 Both values have since declined. Local govern-
ments in Italy, however, have applied high prices for purchase of
the electricity from waste fired, qualifying Law No. 9 of 1991
projects as an important component of the local solution to the
urban waste disposal "emergencies" declared in several Italian
regions.50 Notwithstanding the specific achievements of the Law
No. 9 of 1991 regulatory framework, the lasting importance of
what the Italian experience of these years of complex and often
less than transparent rulemaking achieved was the creation of a
consciousness of the possibilities for electric power development
independent of the national electric monopoly, ENEL.
Law No. 9 of 1991 sets forth the general legal framework
under which privately owned, renewable source plants can ob-
tain long term contracts to sell electricity to ENEL. A series of
decrees by the Minister of Industry and other statutory and regu-
latory measures elaborated this framework.51 This framework
48. Law No. 9 of January 9, 1991, art. 22(5), (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 13
(Jan. 16, 1991).
49. Interministerial Price Committee Measure No. 6 of April 29, 1992, tit. II, art. 1,
(It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 109 (May 2, 1992) (containing prices of electrical energy for trans-
fer, wheeling and production on behalf of ENEL, parameters of exchange, and general
technical conditions for assimilation to renewable sources).
50. Interior Ministry Ordinance No. 2560 of May 2, 1997 (It.) (creating further
additions and modifications to previous ordinances concerning intervention to address
emergency situation in waste disposal sector in Campania Region) [text on file with
authors]; Interior Ministry Ordinance No. 2776 of March 31, 1998 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No.
80 (Apr. 6, 1998) (creating further regulations to combat state of socio-economic and
environmental emergency in Puglia Region); Interior Ministry Ordinance No. 2983 of
May 31, 1999 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 132 (June 8, 1999) (ordering immediate action to
combat emergency situation in urban waste disposal sector in Sicily Region); Interior
Ministry Ordinance No. 2992 of June 23, 1999 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 152 (July 1, 1999)
(ordering immediate actions to combat social, environmental, and civil defense emer-
gency situation in waste disposal sector in Rome and its province).
51. Law No. 9 of January 9, 1991 (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 13 (Jan. 16,
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was meant to facilitate private ownership of independent power
plants. It, however, remained a mercantilist exercise alien to any
embrace of competitive market risk. Three aspects of the frame-
work support this assertion. They are: (1) its merely concession-
ary nature, (2) its provision for subsidization by all electric users
of the Law No. 9 of 1991 initiative, and (3) its reliance exclu-
sively on State credit. The EC competition law review of Law No.
9 of 1991 projects and the EC mandate for competitive public
bidding of contracts to build and operate them will be described
as further confirmation of these points.
The Law No. 9 of 1991 adventure is nevertheless relevant to
the creation of institutions and reorganization of ENEL neces-
sary for the introduction of true competition in the Italian elec-
tric sector, but not because it introduced competition, which in-
deed it did not. Rather, the Law No. 9 of 1991 adventure accom-
plished a rehearsal and training of market actors so that they
could press forward to exploit the beginning of competition now
occuring in the sector. In addition, it demonstrated that signifi-
cant new power generation capacity could be provided outside
ENEL.
1. Legislative and Regulatory Framework
The Law No. 9 framework established two fundamental ele-
ments:
the right to enter into a long term power contract with
1991) (containing rules for implementation of new national energy plan; institutional
aspects, hydroelectric and geothermal, self production, and tax provisions); Law No. 10
of January 9, 1991 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 13 (Jan. 16, 1991) (containing rules for imple-
mentation of new national energy plan concerning reasonable energy use and conser-
vation of renewable energy resources); Interministerial Price Committee Measure No. 6
of April 29, 1992, Gazz. Uff. No. 109 (May 2, 1992) (containing prices of electrical
energy for sale, carriage, and production on behalf of ENEL, exchange parameters and
general technical conditions for assimilation to renewable sources); Ministry of Industry
Decree of August 4, 1994, Gazz. Uff. No. 186 (Aug. 10, 1994) (containing modifications
and completions of Interministerial Price Committee Measure No. 6/1992 in matter of
electric energy transfer prices); Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, supp. ord. to Gazz.
Uff. No. 270 (Nov. 18, 1995) (containing rules for competition and regulation of public
utilities services, and establishment of authority for regulation of public utilities serv-
ices); Ministry of Industry Decree ofJanuary 24, 1997, Gazz. Uff. No. 44 (Feb. 22, 1997)
(dealing with transfer of electric energy of new production from renewable and assimi-
lated sources); Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Deliberation No. 70 of June 26,
1997, Gazz. Uff. No. 150 (June 30, 1997) (concerning rationalization and incorporation
in electric tariff of surcharges not directed, to income of State).
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ENEL after timely completion of required formalities;
and
a methodology for determining the prices to be paid by
ENEL pursuant to the long-term power contract.
The Law No. 9 of 1991 regulatory framework required the fol-
lowing steps to be taken in order to be entitled to enter into a
power purchase contract with ENEL. The project proponents
were required to give notice of intent to develop a power project
to the Ministry of Industry, ENEL, and the relevant local tax of-
fice. The notice was to be accompanied by a report stating:
" general technical characteristics of the installation, in-
cluding type, quantity and quality of production, a utili-
zation plan, and primary fuel source and availability;
" location;
* date of contemplated start of operation; and
" status of authorization procedures.52
If ENEL accepted the notice as satisfactory, then it would in-
clude the proposed project in a list to be published and transmit-
ted to the Ministry of Industry within ninety days of each June 30
and December 31. Upon inclusion in one of the six month
listings (a so-called graduatoria), the project proponents became
eligible to enter into a "preliminary power contract" with ENEL.
The preliminary power contract would contractually bind ENEL
to purchase the project's power at the prices established pursu-
ant to the Law No. 9 of 1991 legal framework. 54 When the pro-
ject would be ready to start operation, the Law No. 9 of 1991
regulatory framework required ENEL to enter into a definitive
power contract, whose form is prescribed by the regulatory
framework.55
Price terms were provided pursuant to regulation and were
therefore not enumerated in either the preliminary or definitive
contracts. Law No. 9 of 1991 charged the Interministerial Price
52. Law No. 9 ofJanuary 9, 1991 (It.), arts. 22(1), (2), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No.
13 (Jan. 16, 1991).
53. Ministry of Industry Decree of September 25, 1992, Gazz. Uff. No. 235 (Oct. 6,
1992).
54. Law No. 9 of 1991 (It.), art. 22(5).
55. Id. art. 22(4).
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Committee, composed of the Minister of Industry and other
ministers, with the specification of pricing.56  In 1992, the In-
terministerial Price Committee issued the price setting method-
ology and set the initial prices by its so-called CIP 6/92 Measure
(or "CIP6"). 57 The functions of the Interministerial Price Com-
mittee were subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Indus-
try-5 and then to the newly created Authority for Electric Energy
and Gas,59 but the initial pricing methodology remains valid.60
For new Law No. 9 of 1991 power plants, the CIP 6/92 Mea-
sure established sub-prices which, added together, formed a to-
tal price for delivered electricity.61 The sub-prices were set to
reflect avoided costs and include elements for the recovery of
capital and operating costs, such as the costs of installation, op-
eration and maintenance, and fuel expense.62 For the various
kinds of projects, a supplementary component was added for the
first eight years of operation, reflecting a preferred price.6' For
years subsequent to the eight-year preferred incentive term,
prices were about one-third of the initial preferred pricing
tariff.64 The sub-prices were updated annually to reflect infla-
56. Id. art. 22(5).
57. Interministerial Price Committee Measure No. 6 of April 27, 1992, Gazz. Uff.
No. 109 (May 2, 1992) [hereinafter CIP 6/92 Measure].
58. Presidential Decree No. 373 of April 20, 1994, art. 5, (It.) Gazz Uff. No. 138
(June 15, 1994); Law No. 537 of December 24, 1993 (It.), Gazz Uff. No. 303 (Dec. 28,
1993) (abolishing Interministerial Price Committee ("CIP")).
59. Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 3(7), (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No.
270 (Nov. 18, 1995).
60. Id. art. 2(28). An argument that the Law No. 9 of 1991 framework falls outside
of Article 87(1) of the EEC Treaty's (Article 83(1) of the Consolidated EC Treaty) pre-
scription against state aids relies upon the initial setting of Law No. 9 of 1991 prices in
relation to market realities and real costs at the time the prices were locked in place.
Other arguments include: CIP 6/92 (or "CIP6") pricing for renewable resource power
plants involves a sector too limited to distort or threaten to distort, within the meaning
of Treaty Article 87 (1) of the EEC Treaty, competition by affecting trade between Mem-
ber States; CIP 6/92 pricing falls within the Article 87(3) (c) definition of aid compati-
ble with the common market, because it is aid to facilitate the development of renewa-
ble resource energy, a goal compatible with Community policies, and does not "ad-
versely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;" and,
the protection of legitimate expectations is a fundamental principle of Community law,
and the passage of time without Community action since the adoption of the Italian
Law No. 9 of 1991 framework bars any interference with application of CIP 6/92 pric-
ing.
61. CIP 6/92 Measure, supra note 57, pmbl.
62. Id. tit. 11.3.
63. Id. tbl. I.
64. Id.
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65tion.
2. Mere Government Concession
The Law No. 9 of 1991 framework is a classic State conces-
sion arrangement for the provision of regulated public utility
services. It provided no market risk for the entities that claimed
entitlement under it. All that a project proponent was required
to do to claim the benefit of an entitlement was to make a
number of informational filings in timely fashion. The only risk
allocated to the project proponent was the risk of failing to com-
plete the process of obtaining the clearances necessary actually
to build and operate the project, and to conclude the contracts
to build, operate, fund, and finance the project in timely fash-
ion. The risks of failing to obtain a building permit from the
local mayor,6 6 an air quality permit from the Ministry of Indus-
67 68try, an environmental clearance, and an appropriate fuel sup-
ply were and remain substantial as evidenced by how few Law
No. 9 of 1991 projects have yet been built.69 Nonetheless, under
the Law No. 9 of 1991 framework, project proponents knew in
advance with certainty the price at which the electric output of
their project would be sold. Also, as a practical matter the risk
65. Id. tit. 11.7.
66. Law No. 10 of January 18, 1977 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 27 (Jan. 29, 1977).
67. Presidential Decree Law No. 203 of May 24, 1988 (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff.
No. 140 (June 16, 1988) (implementing EEC Directives Nos. 779 of 1980, 884 of 1982,
360 of 1984, and 203 of 1985 concerning rules in the matter of air quality relative to
specific polluting agents and pollution produced by industrial installations, pursuant to
Article 15 of Law No. 183 of April 16, 1987).
68. Presidential Decree of April 12, 1996 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 210 (Sept. 7, 1996)
(stating act of address and coordination for implementation of Article 40, first para-
graph, of Law No. 146 of February 22, 1994, concerning provisions in matter of environ-
mental impact evaluation); Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers No. 377
of August 10, 1988 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 204 (Aug. 31, 1988) (regulations on determina-
tions of environmental compatibility pursuant to Article 6 of Law No. 349 of July 8,
1986, establishing Ministry of Environment and rules on environmental damage);
Council Directive No. 85/337, OJ. L 175/40 (July 5, 1985) (assessing effects of certain
public and private projects on environment).
69. Large Law No. 9 of 1991 projects under construction include Saarlux (551 MW
heavy oil refinery residue plant located in refinery near Cagliari, Sardinia), ISAB (513
megawatt (or "MW") high sulfur residual oil plant located in refinery near Siracusa,
Sicily), and API Energia (284 MW heavy oil plant located in refinery at Falconara on
Adriatic coast). A large completed project is Rosen (380 MW combined cycle gas tur-
bine plant located at Rosignano, Tuscany, chemical plant). For information on these
and a handful of other more modest projects, see Italy, INT'L PRIVATE POWER Q., July
1999, at 205-06.
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that they bore was limited to their out-of-pocket costs. The pros-
pect of a meaningful claim against the proponents of a Law No.
9 of 1991 project for damages as a result of failure to build a
contemplated power plant was remote, 7° particularly if the pro-
ject proponents obtained the Law No. 9 of 1991 entitlements
through a limited liability company without other assets.
3. Funding Transfer Mechanism: No Burden on ENEL;
No Accountability
Understanding the financing of a Law No. 9 of 1991 project
company furthers appreciation of the extent to which the Law
No. 9 of 1991 framework reflects the concept of State allocation
of resources and limited assumption of market risk. As a basic
proposition, ENEL, now succeeded by the National Transmis-
sion Manager, Ente Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazion-
ale, S.p.A., pays the full purchase price, including the premium
pursuant to the power purchase agreement. Two significant
components of the price, however, are covered by resources pro-
vided through the Cassa Conguaglio per il Settore Elettrico
("CCSE") accounts. The two components covered through
CCSE resources are: (1) the fuel cost component of the
"avoided cost" component, and (2) the "greater cost of the spe-
cific kind of plant," which is the substantial eight year incentive
70. Article 15(4) of Legislative Decreee No. 79 ("Bersani Decree") allows the hold-
ers of qualified CIP 6/92 contracts to surrender without sanction their CIP 6/92 con-
tract rights within six months of the Bersani Decree's effective date. Article 16 of the
standard form contract mandated by the 1992 Ministry of Industry Decree provides a
force majeure clause as follows: "The periods of unavailability of capacity to ENEL or
periods of non-acceptance by ENEL due to cause of force majeure not imputable, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the seller producer or to ENEL, respectively, are exempt from
any penalty." The preliminary power conventions signed by ENEL typically included a
further clause providing for ENEL reliance damages only if project delay seriously af-
fects ENEL, as follows:
Nonperformance of the obligations.., not due to causes of force majeure,
will be regulated according to the rules of ordinary law in the matter of con-
tractual responsibility. In case of serious delay in the execution of works im-
putable to Producer, understanding for such serious delay that greater than
one year, so as to imply the necessity of a revision of the investment programs
of ENEL S.p.A., this latter will have the option of requesting the rescission of
the present convention, without prejudice to except the right of reimburse-
ment of the eventual damage.
Id. This is an unlikely scenario given the large scale of ENEL and, with a handful of
exceptions, the generally small scale of CIP 6/92 projects.
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provided pursuant to Law No. 9 of 1991.71 The funds collected
through the CCSE accounts cover substantially all of the incen-
tive component of the price mandated by Law No. 9 of 1991, i.e.,
about two-thirds of the favorable CIP6 pricing during the eight-
year incentive period.
The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas' Deliberation
No. 70 of 1997,72 one of the authority's first official acts, estab-
lished a CCSE account for new plants from "renewable and as-
similated sources." This account is used to collect a surcharge
on final electric users to cover the "fuel cost" and "greater cost of
the specific kind of plant" components mentioned above as re-
imbursed through CCSE resources. The general purpose of De-
liberation No. 70 of 1997 was to "rationalize" Italian electric tar-
iffs for final users. As part of simplifying and resetting the rates
paid by final users, it also updated the long-standing CCSE ar-
rangements. 73 In essence, through Deliberation No. 70 and its
subsequent deliberations,7 4 the Authority for Electric Energy
and Gas maintained the preexisting status quo pursuant to
71. Law No. 9 of January 9, 1991 (It.), art. 22(5), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 13
(Jan. 16, 1991).
72. Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Deliberation No. 70 of June 26, 1997,
Gazz. Uff. No. 150 (June 30, 1997).
73. Id. The principal surcharges on final users that continue to exist pursuant to
Deliberation No. 70 are: "A2" surcharge for abandonment of nuclear plants; "A"
surcharge to fund the account for new plants fueled by renewable and assimilated
sources; and "B" surcharge, consisting principally of the "thermal surcharge" and some
other variable components. Id. art. 3. For 1999, the total CIP 6/92 price to be paid by
ENEL for renewable resource projects was 273.8, not 289.8 lire/kWh. Deliberation No.
81 of June 8, 1999, art. 3. The four regulatorily established components of this price
are: (1) avoided cost of installation; (2) avoided cost of operation, maintenance, and
general related expenses; (3) avoided cost of fuel; and (4) avoided cost for particular
type of plant. Deliberation No. 81 ofJune 8, 1999, art. 2, tbl. Of the four components
of the CIP 6/92 price, the surcharge A3 would cover elements (3) and (4); namely, the
regulatorily established 58.4 lire/kWh for avoided fuel costs, and 187.8 lire/kWh for
avoided cost for particular type of plant. Hence, more than two thirds of the price to be
paid for a kilowatt-hour of electricity from a CIP 6/92 renewable source project (246.2
out of 289.8 lire in 1997) is covered through the CCSE surcharge mechanism.
74. Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Deliberation No. 70 of June 26, 1997,
Gazz. Uff. No. 150 (June 30, 1997). Deliberation No. 81 of June 8, 1999 updates the
avoided cost components of the prices on the sale of power to ENEL under the CIP 6/
92 by lowering them slightly. Most recently, Deliberation No. 160 of October 25, 1999
reset the A3 surcharge at the amount of 11.6 lire/kWh, down from its value of 13.0 lire/
kWh under Deliberation No. 70 of 1997, presumably because of delay in start-up of Law
No. 9 of 1991 projects. The A3 surcharge is of limited impact relative to other
surcharges. Under Deliberation No. 24, the total "A" and "B" surcharges for residential
users are 40.1 lire/kWh, of which the A3 element, as mentioned, is 11.6 lire/kWh.
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which final users as a class cover most of the CIP6 renewable
resource electricity purchase costs.
The CCSE system of surcharging all electric consumers to
"equalize" ENEL's and other power distributors' costs has ex-
isted for many years.75 The surcharge system began to assume its
present form as far back as the oil price shocks of the 1970s. At
that time, a thermal burden surcharge was used to buffer the
increase in the price of fuel used by ENEL and other Italian
power producers, such as the municipal electric companies. The
purpose of the thermal burden surcharge was to ensure a uni-
form national price of electricity and to buffer rapid fluctuations
in fuel prices. The CCSE was responsible for the payment of the
proceeds of the thermal surcharge to the various power produ-
cers according to specified criteria related to the impact on such
producers of the price of fossil fuel. Pursuant to these criteria, a
power producer, such as a municipal electric company, whose
power generation facilities are largely hydroelectric, would re-
ceive less than another producer whose generation facilities
were entirely thermal. In addition to the thermal burden
surcharge, surcharges were created in connection with Italy's
abandonment of its nuclear power program,76 as well as in con-
nection with the Law No. 9 of 1991 independent power sector.
Interestingly, the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas rec-
ommended to the Industry and Treasury ministries that they not
consider obligations to pay for Law No. 9 of 1991 power as
stranded costs in connection with provision for payment to
ENEL of liabilities assumed prior to the opening of electricity
markets to competition.77 This recommendation is consistent
with the CCSE transfer mechanism. That is, the CCSE transfer
mechanism assures that the cost of Law No. 9 of 1991 power is
spread over a substantial base of electricity consumers, rather
than imposed on one electric company.
4. ENEL's Credit as the State's Credit
The credit rating that has counted in the financing of Law
No. 9 of 1991 projects is that of the Italian State. Moody's Inves-
75. Gazz. Uff. No. 181 (July 11, 1974).
76. Following a 1987 national referendum, Italy legislated the retirement of the
then existing nuclear power plants in 1988. ENEL PROSPECrUS, supra note 12, at 61.
77. Id. at 108.
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tors Service has rated Italian sovereign debt as Aa3.7" Italy's sov-
ereign debt rating matters because pursuant to Italian Civil Code
Section 2362," 9 the Italian State, as the sole shareholder of ENEL
at the time of ENEL's signature of the preliminary power con-
tracts, is liable for the power payments in the event of any subse-
quent insolvency of ENEL, or of its successors in the event of
privatization or other reorganization of ENEL. °
Moody's Investors Service rated ENEL's senior unsecured
lira denominated Eurobonds as Aa3, 1 the same rating Moody's
assigns Italy's sovereign debt. Moody's analysis of ENEL's credit
profile is based primarily on a sovereign analysis of the Italian
State, rather than specific analysis of ENEL. This is consistent
with the foregoing observation of the significance of Italian Civil
Code Section 2362. What this illustrates is that Law No. 9 of
1991 projects have not faced real competitive market risks. The
Italian outcome is approximately equivalent to that for a U.S.
project proponent under PURPA. There, the project proponent
looks to the credit ratings of an electric utility with a territorial
monopoly that earns a return on its asset fixed by the state pub-
lic utility commission. Although a regulated U.S. utility is not a
sovereign, the credit risks in each instance reflect isolation from
competitive market discipline.
5. EC Competition Clearance as Exception to Prohibition on
Anti-Competitive Agreements
That Law No. 9 of 1991 projects potentially fall within the
scope of Community antitrust law is a further confirmation of
how the Law No. 9 of 1991 regime falls outside a system of true
competitive risk. The Law No. 9 of 1991 power purchase agree-
ments require the project company to sell, and ENEL to
purchase, all of the electric energy produced by the relevant pro-
ject for the term established by the power purchase agreement.
The exclusive purchase arrangement could be argued to violate
78. Moody's Investors Service, Analyst Toolbox: ENEL (Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
79. CODICE CIVILE, § 2362 (It.). Section 2362 states: "[i]n the case of insolvency of
a company, for company obligations which arose in the time when the shares have been
owned by a sole person, the latter has unlimited liability." Id.
80. Article 3(2) of the Bersani Decree provides that ENEL's rights and obligations
to the Law No. 9 of 1991 contracts are transferred to the new national transmission
manager, Ente Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale, S.p.A., discussed below.
81. Moody's Investors Service, supra note 78.
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Treaty of Rome Article 85 (Treaty of Amsterdam Article 81)82
prohibition on agreements that restrict competition. Likewise,
the "cumulative effect" of various Law No. 9 of 1991 power
purchase contracts on competition in electric power markets
could be argued to violate the same prohibition.8" The conse-
quence of violating the prohibition on competition restriction is
the nullity of the offending contract.84 Not surprisingly, it has
been the practice of lenders to Law No. 9 of 1991 projects to
request some comfort from the Commission.
One of the earliest of the EC regulations, Regulation No. 17
of 1962, establishes the procedure for formally requesting the
Commission to determine that the Treaty of Rome Article 85
(Treaty of Amsterdam Article 81) prohibition does not apply or
that the benefits of the agreement justify the granting of an ex-
emption. 85 In essence, this is a request that the Commission find
either that
(1) the power contract is not an "agreement between un-
dertakings which may affect trade between Member
States and which [has] as [its] object or effect the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market" (a determination that Article
85(1) is not breached); or
(2) the power contract is an agreement between undertak-
ings that contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or eco-
nomic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, without imposing undue re-
strictions or eliminating competition with respect to a
82. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 81, O.J. C 340/3, at 208-09 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 93-94 (ex
Article 85).
83. Brasserie De Haecht S.A. v. Wilkin and Another, Case 23/67, [1967] E.C.R.
407, [1968] C.M.L.R. 26 (discussing first "network effect" of cumulation of similar con-
tracts); Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Br-iu AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935,
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210 (holding that bundles of similar contracts do not perse impermis-
sibly restrict market access); Schbeller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission,
Case T-9/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1611 (holding Brasserie De Haecht and Delimitis not
limited to beer distribution).
84. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(2), 298 U.N.T.S. at 48; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 81 (2), O.J. C 340/3, at 208 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 93 (ex Article
85).
85. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87, amended by Commission Regulation No. 3385/94, O.J. L 377/28 (1994).
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substantial part of the products in question (the grant
of an exemption based on the Article 85(3) criteria for
exemption from the Article 85(1) prohibition).
In one of the first projects under Law No. 9 of 1991, the 507
megawatt (or "MW") ISAB project located in Priolo Gargallo,
near Syracuse, Sicily,86 the Commission declined to make a for-
mal ruling. Rather, it issued an informal and private comfort
letter by the Commission staff.17 Notwithstanding the increased
transparency of Community law generally, the Commission's
comfort letters remain unpublished, confidential documents.88
The ISAB project benefited from a twenty-year power contract to
transfer its electric output to ENEL S.p.A.89 In its public notice
pursuant to Council Regulation No. 17 of 1962, the Commission
invited comment on its intention to take "a favourable position
valid for 15 years in respect of the power purchase agreement."90
Presumably the favorable position was that for fifteen years the
power purchase agreement fell within the Treaty of Rome Arti-
cle 85(3) (Treaty of Amsterdam Article 81(3)) exemption. The
comfort letter of the Commission staff has not been officially
published, but the project's financing is a confirmation that it
was issued by the Commission and relied upon by project propo-
nents and their lenders.
6. Community Law Mandate for Competitive Bidding of
Construction Contracts by Virtue of Dependence on
Public Monopoly
Community law requires Member States to mandate com-
petitive public bidding for government contracts.91 The Italian
86. Commission Decision No. IV/E-3/35.698, OJ. C 138/3 (May 9, 1996) (Isab
Energy).
87. Id.; see also Commission Decision No. IV/E-3/35.455, 0J. C 118/7 (Apr. 23,
1996) (REN/Turbogfs) (stating that Commission solicited comment on its intention to
issue comfort letter providing approval of 15 year exclusive purchase and sale contract
between independent 990 MW power plant project company in Portugal and Portu-
guese national utility).
88. See MENGOZZI, supra note 10, at 114-19 (discussing Community acts, such as
comfort letters, not contemplated by Community treaties).
89. Isab Energy, O.J. C 138/3, at 3.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Council Directive No. 531 of September 17, 1990, OJ. L 297/1 (1990); Coun-
cil Directive No. 38 of June 14, 1993, OJ. L 199/84 (1993).
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implementing measure, 92 consistent with the Community re-
quirement, requires public bidding of the construction and op-
eration contracts for Law No. 9 of 1991 projects because they
benefited from the public monopoly and fixed price for the
projects' output."3 This is a further recognition of the public,
non-competitive nature of the Law No. 9 of 1991 framework.
7. A Pseudo-Market: Practice for the Real Thing
The publication of the so called graduatoria lists of projects
that achieved the entitlement provided by the Law No. 9 of 1991
process occurred seven times from 1992 through 1995.14 Be-
cause of the ease of entitlement to sign a potentially valuable
preliminary contract with ENEL, many parties, including many
with no prior electric sector experience, qualified. Similar to
PURPA, ENEL and others in the Italian government sought ways
to extinguish the entitlements obtained pursuant to Law No. 9
of 1991. A first approach was to determine that projects admit-
ted to graduatoria after the sixth graduatoria would not benefit
from the favorable CIP6 pricing.95 A second approach was to
declare that projects listed in the graduatoria for which prelimi-
nary contracts remained unsigned by the end of 1996 would lose
all rights.96
Law No. 481 of 1995, the law that provided for creation of
92. Legislative Decree No. 158 of March 17, 1995 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 104 (May 6,
1995).
93. Id. art. 2(b). Relative to telecommunications, Italy now benefits from an ex-
emption to the analogous requirement by virtue of a finding of its telecommunication
sector's openness to competition. See Simap Public Procurement News, Commission
Communication of May 12, 1999, (visited on Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.simap.eu.int>
(on file with the Fordham International law Journal) (listing services deemed excluded
from competitive bidding requirements pursuant to Article 8, Directive No. 38 of June
14, 1993, coordinating procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, en-
ergy, transportation, and telecommunications sectors).
94. The seven graduatorie corresponding to the six month period from the second
half of 1992 through the second half of 1995 were published in the Staffetta Quotidiana
from 1994-1996, see <http://www.staffettaonline.it> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
95. Ministry of Industry Decree of July 19, 1996, Gazz. Uff. No. 172 (july 24, 1996).
96. Ministry of Industry Decree of November 25, 1996 (regarding suspension of
July 19, 1996 Decree) [text on file with authors]; Decree Law No. 473 of September 13,
1996 (concerning urgent rulings on transparency of electricity fees), Gazz. Uff. No. 216
(Sept. 14, 1996); Ministry of Industry Decree of July 19, 1996, Gazz. Uff. No. 172 (July
24, 1996) (stating changes to rules governing pricing in connection with power plants
using renewable sources).
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the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, grandfathered the
preferred pricing for the CIP6 projects through language that
emerged from an intensely lobbied legislative effort,97 but efforts
to limit the Law No. 9 of 1991 incentives continued. A further
restrictive approach was to mandate acceptance of ENEL inter-
connection estimates and down payments of interconnection
costs within a short period after the preliminary contract signa-
ture.98 In 1996, ENEL announced that it would not sign con-
sents to assignment for security purposes.99 The various efforts
to avoid payment of the preferred Law No. 9 of 1991 pricing led
to administrative litigation 0 0 as well as the legislative battles in
97. Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 3(7), (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No.
270 (Nov. 18, 1995). Law No. 481 of 1985 states, in relevant part:
The CIP 6 measure of April 29, 1992 ... as supplemented and modified ... is
applicable for all the duration of the contract, to the initiatives pre-selected at
the effective date of this law [meaning initiatives listed in graduatorie through
the sixth graduatoria for the first six months of 1995], for purposes of enter-
ing into the contracts, including preliminary contracts, contemplated by the
Decree of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts of September 25,
1992... as well as proposals of transfer of electric power produced from re-
newable sources specifically said, presented to ENEL S.p.A. by December 31,
1994. For the other initiatives the existing rules in effect, including the cited
CIP 6 measure of 1992 and the relative updates contemplated.., by article 22,
paragraph 5, of law January 9, 1991 No. 9 which will take into account the
principles of article 1 of this law, continue to apply.
Gazz. Uff. No. 270 at 11.
98. Ministry of Industry Decree of January 24, 1992, Gazz. Uff. No. 44 of February
22, 1997.
99. See Letter from Giuseppe Zadra, Director General, Italian Banking Association,
to ENEL S.p.A. and Independent Power Industry Trade Association ("UNAPACE")
(Feb. 17, 1997) (concerning production of electric energy from renewable and assimi-
lated sources pursuant to Article 22 of Law No. 9 of 1991). In this letter, the Italian
Banking Association asserted to ENEL the importance of ENEL's signature of consents
to assignment for security purposes. Nonetheless, absent a direct contractual undertak-
ing of ENEL in favor of lenders, lender step in rights could be provided on the basis of
a pledge with right to vote of the shares of the project company signatory of the power
contract with ENEL. See also CODICE ClVILE § 2786 (It.) (concerning pledge of mov-
ables); CODICE CVMLE § 2342 (It.) (stating that voting rights of pledged shares are held
by pledging creditors). Another elaboration would be an option to lease a going con-
cern, exercisable upon an event of default under the power contract. ComcE CIviLE
§§ 2561-62 (It.). ENEL subsequently adopted a cooperative posture relative to granting
its consent to assignment in favor of lenders for security purposes.
100. See, e.g., complaints filed with Lazio regional administrative tribunal:
* E.A.T.-Energia Toscana S.r.1 v. Ministry of Industry, Sept. 20, 1996;
" Ecor Energy S.r.l. v. Ministry of Industry, Sept. 20, 1996;
" E.P. Sistemi S.r.l. v. Ministry of Industry, Sept. 20, 1996;
* Laterificio Lucano S.r.l. v. Ministry of Industry, Sept. 20, 1996;
• PFM S.r.l. v. Ministry of Industry, Nov. 6, 1996;
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connection with Law No. 481 of 1995.101 A 1997 Ministry of In-
dustry decree fixed abbreviated time requirements for the pay-
ment of interconnection costs. 10 2 In 1999, the Authority for
Electric Energy and Gas commenced evaluation of its authority
to reset the prices at lower values. 10 3 Most recently, the Bersani
Decree, discussed below, established that CIP6 entitlements
would expire for projects for which construction clearances are
not obtained by April 1, 2000.104
* Pordenone Ambiente Energia S.r.1. v. Ministry of Industry, Nov. 6, 1996;
" Sicob Energia S.r.1. v. Ministry of Industry, Sept. 20, 1996.
101. See Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 3(7), (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff.
No. 270 (Nov. 18, 1995).
102. See Ministry of Industry Decree of January 24, 1997, Gazz. Uff. No. 44 (Feb.
22, 1997) (concerning transfer of electric energy of new production from renewable
and assimilated sources).
103. After issuing its invitation for comment on a proposal to reset downward the
Law No. 9 of 1991 prices, AUTHORITY FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY AND GAS, GUIDELINES AND
PROPOSALS FOR UPDATING THE PRICES OF ELECTRIC POWER FOR TRANSFER TO ENEL S.p.A.
AND CONTRIBUTIONS ACCORDED TO PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTORS FOR NEW ENERGY FROM
PLANTS UTILIZING RENEWABLE AND ASSIMILATED SOURCES, (Milan, Feb. 4, 1999) [herein-
after AUTHORITY GUIDELINES], the Authority did in fact modestly diminish them for two
limited categories of project, namely the initiatives that were not listed as approved for
Law No. 9 of 1991 entitlements as of June 30, 1995 (date of the sixth graduatoria) for
renewable sources, and all initiatives using conventional fuel sources. Authority Delib-
eration No. 81 of June 8, 1999 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 158 (July 8, 1999). It then asked the
advisory section of the Council of State for a ruling as to whether it has the power to
reset the prices for Law No. 9 of 1991 initiatives approved for Law No. 9 of 1991 entitle-
ments by listing on graduatoria through the sixth graduatoria and hence grandfathered
pursuant to Article 3(7) of Law No. 481 of 1995. The Council of State responded that
the statutory protection of the pricing for such projects left the Authority for Electric
Energy and Gas without such power. Italy: CIP 6 Clears, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Jan. 12,
2000, at 31.
104. Bersani Decree, supra note 43, art. 15. The Carpi Commission, whose work
led to the Bersani Decree, believed that the Law No. 9 of 1991 incentives should be
limited. In its final report, it stated:
The incentive for the utilization of renewable and assimilated sources ... is
justified both by the contribution that these give to the improving of local and
global environmental impact, as well as by the guarantees in the matter of
supply, and through employment: the actual body of rules, however, should
be reconsidered but maintaining unchanged the acquired rights, to correct
certain limits which have emerged in the approximately four years of applica-
tion. In particular it does not seem acceptable that the overall amount of the
incentives to be paid is known only after the fact: according to calculations of
the Commission, the approximately 9000 MW admitted to enjoy the incentive
(of which 1200 MW are ENEL's), if effectively completed, would imply an ex-
penditure of about 25,000 billion (in 1996 lira) to be paid, for the most part,
over a period of 10-12 years, with an annual expense greater, for certain years,
than 3000 billion. Among the holders of the acquired rights do not enter
those who have presented applications after the sixth graduatoria (June 30,
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The opportunity to realize further Law No. 9 of 1991
projects is diminishing. The Bersani Decree favors Law No. 9 of
1991 projects by providing certain answers to a number of ques-
tions that threatens the further viability of unbuilt projects. 105 At
the same time, it establishes deadlines, notably the above men-
tioned deadline that authorizations necessary to construct a pro-
ject be obtained by April 1, 2000, which is a difficult deadline to
meet.'
0 6
Italy's experience with Law No. 9 of 1991 helps explain how
1995), considered that ENEL has declared its own unavailability to acquire
new energy not requested by the market.
CARPI COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION FOR IDENTIFICA-
TION OF THE METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND PRIORITIES TO PROMOTE LIBERALIZATION OF THE
ITALIAN ENERGY MARKET: PROGRESSIVE COMPETITION AMONG PRODUCERS, THE BEST
GUARANTEES IN FAVOR OF USERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Jan. 28, 1997).
105. Although not resolving all issues relative to CIP 6/92 power contracts, the
Bersani Decree's Article 15 clarifies a number of points. The points are:
" the terms on which a CIP 6/92 contract may be relocated;
" the terms on which the fuel contemplated for a CIP 6/92 contract may be
changed;
" the dates that must be satisfied for continued validity of a CIP 6/92 contract;
" the terms on which a CIP 6/92 contract may be aggregated with others; and
• the identity of the decision-makers and the procedures relative to the forego-
ing.
In brief, the answers to each of the foregoing points are:
* If a CIP 6/92 project renounces "public incentives" and receives the favorable
opinion of the competent local entities, then the Ministry of Industry must ap-
prove its relocation. With the benefit of a reasoned request and the favorable
opinion of the competent local entities, the Ministry of Industry may approve
the relocation. With the benefit of the favorable opinion of the competent
local authorities and a simple notice to the Ministry of Industry, waste recovery
projects may be relocated.
" ENEL, and now its successor Ente Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale
S.p.A., retains discretion to approve changes in fuel.
* CIP 6/92 entitlement holders must meet the start up date established by the
relevant preliminary contract, subject to the one year grace period written into
most preliminary contracts. The Industry Ministry may grant an up to two year
extension for "justified" delay, but the extension does not extend the contractu-
ally established period for the running of the CIP 6/92 incentive-based prices.
Failure to obtain the authorizations necessary to construct a plant by April 1,
2000 voids the CIP 6/92 incentives.
" With favorable opinion of the competent local authorities, notice to the Indus-
try Ministry, and "documented technical reasons," capacity can be transferred
to other locations.
* In all cases, approval of the competent local authorities is necessary. ENEL,
and now its successor Ente Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale S.p.A.,
decides on fuel changes. The Industry Ministry decides on other matters.
106. Bersani Decree, supra note 43, art. 15.
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novel and important it is for Italy to embrace the policies of com-
petition by providing institutional independent regulatory com-
missions, as well as an initial opening for new actors to under-
take activity formerly within ENEL's monopoly. Although judi-
cial recourse is available under Law No. 9 of 1991, the true Law
No. 9 of 1991 story demonstrates a political and institutional in-
ertia that judicial intervention alone can not address. The subse-
quent innovation of the new Authorities was necessary for real
progress to occur.
D. Changing Political Culture
Italy, like the rest of the Community Member States, has
now largely accepted the supremacy of EC law. In addition, sig-
nificant elements of Italy's political culture have changed since
the early 1960s. Italy's economy, as confirmed by its participa-
tion in the European Monetary Union, has become more open
to the rest of Europe. Perhaps most importantly, the Italian
legal and political system has matured.107 The mani pulite, or
clean hands, corruption prosecutions are widely regarded as evi-
dence of a change in how Italian public life is conducted, includ-
ing the state agencies within government control. Indeed, in
one of the leading mani pulite cases in which former Prime Min-
ister Benito Craxi was convicted of corruption by a Milan court,
the former president of ENEL was also convicted of participation
in the corruption. °8
The Italian legal and political system has begun to accept
the logic of economic competition. 10 9 This concept is antitheti-
cal to ENEL's creation as a national monopoly intended to reap
the benefits of State economic planning, to achieve economies
of scale, and to offer national electric service with uniform price
conditions. The acceptance of economic competition is mani-
fested in the legislative creation of the framework to satisfy Com-
munity competition mandates relative to the electric power and
telecommunication sectors, both previously dominated by the
107. For a sustained discussion of its growing pains from an active participant, see
FELICE MORTILLARO, LA VIA ITALANA AL CAPITALISMO: ScRiTri 1970-1995 (1997).
108. Milan Tribunale, order of May 19, 1999, sentencing, among others, former
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, former president of state holding company IRI Franco
Nobili, and Franco Viezzoli, the former president of ENEL.
109. See, e.g., Franco De Benedetti, Tc, spezzare il monopolio, IL SOLE-2 4 ORE, May
23, 1995.
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State. In the early 1960s, there were no Italian governmental
institutions whose express purpose was to implement Commu-
nity policy, so as to achieve competitive markets. Currently, the
four independent regulatory commissions discussed below ac-
tively embrace the values of Community policy initiatives to es-
tablish competitive markets.
E. Independent Regulatory Commissions
Rather than dismiss the significance of Community law as-
was the case in 1964-Italy's legislature in more recent years has
created independent regulatory commissions to embrace Com-
munity competition mandates. These commissions, known as
the Authorities, are energetically working to implement their
mandate. Italy's independent regulatory commissions model af-
ter the U.S. New Deal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The first
Italian independent regulatory commission was the Commis-
sione Nazionale per le SocietA e la Borsa, or National Commis-
sion for Companies and the Stock Exchange ("CONSOB"),
which began in 1974110 to regulate Italy's securities markets. In
1994, Italy's Antitrust Authority commenced operation.'11 Most
recently, the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas and the Au-
thority for Guarantees in Communications (or "AGC") began to
function, respectively, in 1997112 and 1998.11
CONSOB and the Antitrust Authority were created under
the general pressure to keep up with Europe's growing internal
market integration. The Authorities for Electric Energy and Gas
and for Guarantees in Communications were created specifically
to meet the mandates of Community directives to establish com-
petition in the electric and telecommunication sectors. The
electric energy and telecommunications Authorities' creation il-
lustrates an Italian consideration of, and response to, Commu-
nity law and policy initiatives qualitatively different than what oc-
curred relative to ENEL's creation forty years ago. The current
110. Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 149 (June 8, 1974).
111. Antitrust Authority Homepage (visited on Feb. 12, 2000) <http://
www.acm.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
112. Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Homepage (visited on Feb. 12, 2000)
<http://www.autorita.energia.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
113. Communications Ministry Deliberation No. 17 of June 16, 1998 (It.), supp.
ord. No. 128 to Gazz. Uff. No. 169 (July 21, 1998).
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relationship of Italian and Community law is not one of apoca-
lyptic clash. Rather, in the electric power and telecommunica-
tion sectors, Community law provides impulse to accomplish re-
form aimed at the creation of competitive markets, and the new
Italian institutional actors embrace this mandate. To appreciate
what the Authorities are accomplishing, it is helpful to first un-
derstand the Community directives that they implement.
III. COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES
A. Community Directive No. 92 of 1996 on Liberalization of Electric
Power Markets
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Community was focused
on achievement of a single "internal market," as contemplated
by the Single European Act, 1 4 the 1987 amendment to the trea-
ties instituting the three European Communities. As part of this
effort, the Council adopted Directive No. 547 of October 29,
1990115 on transmission of electricity through transmission grids
and Directive No. 377 ofJune 29, 1990116 establishing a Commu-
nity procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity
prices charged to industrial end-users. These Directives pre-
pared the way for the more far-reaching Council Directive No.
92 of December 19, 1996,117 which mandates restructuring na-
tional electricity markets in order to open them to competition,
starting with an emphasis on larger consumers of electricity. Di-
rective No. 92 of 1996 "establishes common rules for the genera-
tion, transmission and distribution of electricity. It lays down the
rules relating to the organization and functioning of the electric-
ity sector, access to the market, the criteria and procedures ap-
plicable to calls for tender and the granting of authorizations
and the operation of systems. " 118
Directive No. 92 of 1996 furthers policies that the Commu-
114. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 11).
115. Council Directive No. 90/547, O.J. L 313/30 (1990).
116. Council Directive No. 90/377, O.J. L 185/16 (1990).
117. Council Directive No. 96/92, O.J. L 27/20 (1996). For a discussion of the
negotiations leading to the adoption of the directive, see Angus Johnston, Maintaining
the Balance of Power: Liberalisation, Reciprocity and Electricity in the European Community, 17
J. ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES L. 121 (1999).
118. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 27/20, at 22 (1996).
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nity's 1995 White Paper on Energy1 9 identified, namely:
* competition to integrate formerly divided national en-
ergy markets;
" sustainable development; and
* secure power delivery.
As a first step towards achieving these goals, Directive No. 92 of
1996's mandate to increase competition between larger electric-
ity users implies the opening to competition, initially of about a
fourth, growing to a third over a six-year period, of national elec-
tric power markets. 120
Directive No. 92 of 1996 leaves room for national discretion
and thereby potentially invites Community litigation, via: (1)
Commission competition law decisions appealed to the Euro-
pean Court of First Instance and the ECJ, 1 2 1 (2) actions to con-
demn a Member State before the ECJ for failure to implement a
directive,1 22 or (3) reference of questions of Community law to
the ECJ by national courts.12 3 It invites such litigation by temper-
ing the mandate of a competitive structure for national electric-
ity markets with a recognition that a Member State "in the gen-
eral economic interest"124 may impose limits on competition
through "public service obligations which may relate to security,
including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of sup-
plies and to environmental protection."125 Likewise, it permits
the Member States to refuse some of the Directive's key struc-
tural requirements, but only "insofar as the development of
trade would not be affected to such an extent as would be con-
119. Commission of the European Communities, An Energy Policy For the Euro-
pean Union: White Paper from the Commission to the European Parliament, COM
(95) 682 Final (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter White Paper].
120. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission: An Overall View of Energy Policy and Actions, COM (97) Draft, at 14.
121. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 173, 184, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76, 78; Consoli-
dated EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 230, 241, O.J. C 340/3, at 272, 275 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 125, 127 (ex Articles 173 and 184).
122. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 226, OJ. C 340/3, at 271 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article
169).
123. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 234, O.J. C 340/3, at 273-74 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex
Article 177 )
124. Council Directive No. 96/92, art. 3(2), OJ. L 27/20, at 23 (1996).
125. Id.
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trary to the interests of the Community." 126
Each of these standards raises questions, which ajudicial de-
termination relative to specific facts can easily be envisaged if a
Member State fails to embrace the Directive's goal of competi-
tive markets. Although litigation of these points has not yet
arisen, it is easy to contemplate, for example, a low marginal cost
French nuclear utility such as EDF complaining of how a neigh-
boring Member State's less-than-full implementation of the rele-
vant Directive provisions frustrates its ability to sell to large users.
Given Italy's embrace of the Directive's mandates in the Bersani
Decree, it is unlikely that Italy would be a significant source of
such litigation.
The Directive offers two alternative approaches to system ac-
cess and leaves the choice to the Member States, with the proviso
that each approach "lead to equivalent economic results and
hence to a directly comparable level of opening up of markets
and to a directly comparable degree of access to the electricity
markets."1 2 7 Member States may provide for negotiated12 8 or
regulated 129 terms of access to the transmission system, or they
may provide for a single buyer,13 1 i.e., a legal person "responsible
for the unified management of the transmission system and/or
for centralized electricity purchasing and selling."13 As dis-
cussed below, the Bersani Decree adopted the latter choice for
Italy.
As for new generation capacity construction, Member States
may opt for a pure authorization procedure or for a bidding pro-
cedure-which allows auto producers and independent produ-
cers to obtain authorization-always subject to "objective, trans-
parent and non-discriminatory" criteria.'1 2 As discussed below,
the Bersani Decree maintained the authorization procedure for
Italy.
Member States must designate or require the undertakings
that own transmission systems to designate an independently
managed operator to run the system in a neutral fashion, taking
126. Id. art. 3(3), O.J. L 27/20, at 23 (1996).
127. Id. arts. 3(1), (16), o.J. L 27/20, at 23 (1996).
128. Id. art. 17(1), O.J. L 27/20, at 26 (1996).
129. Id. art. 17(4), O.J. L 27/20, at 26 (1996).
130. Id. art. 18, O.J. L 27/20, at 26-27 (1996).
131. Id. art. 2(22), O.J. L 27/20, at 23 (1996).
132. Id. art. 4, O.J. L 27/20, at 23 (1996).
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into account efficiency, economic balance, and security of sup-
ply.' 3 Member States may impose on distribution companies an
obligation to supply customers in a given area.1 34 Accounts of
generation, transmission, and distribution activities are to be
kept separately. 135
The Directive requires over time that Member States define
an increasing percentage of final users of electricity as "eligible
customers" able to contract freely with generators of electricity
for the supply of electric energy through the transmission system
to be operated by the system operator. 136 Initially the market
open to competition is supposed to correspond to customers
consuming more than 40 gigawatt hours (or "GWh") per year on
a consumption site basis. 137 The threshold is reduced to 20
GWh after three years and six years later to 9 GWh. 1 8 Member
States are required annually to publish their criteria for eligibil-
ity to participate in the competitive market, and the Commission
may request, and if unsatisfied, impose modifications. 39
B. Community Directives on Liberalization of Telecommunications
Six Community Directives mandate Member States to intro-
duce competition to telecommunications markets: 140
* Commission Directive No. 301 of May 16, 1988 mandat-
ing competition in the supply of telecommunications
terminal equipment;4
* Council Directive No. 387 of June 28, 1990 mandating
opening of access to public communications net-
works;14
2
133. Id. arts. 7, 8, 9, O.J. L 27/20, at 24-25 (1996).
134. Id. art. 10, O.J. L 27/20, at 25 (1996).
135. Id. art. 13, 14, 15, O.J. L 27/20, at 25-26 (1996).
136. Id. art. 19, O.J. L 27/20, at 27 (1996).
137. Id. art. 19(1), O.J. L 27/20, at 27 (1996).
138. Id. art. 19(2), O.J. L 27/20, at 27 (1996).
139. Id. art. 19(4), O.J. L 27/20, at 27 (1996).
140. For confirmation that the Treaty of Rome provides a basis for Community
initiatives to institute competition in the telecommunications sector, see France v. Com-
mission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (responding to
challenge by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy of foundation of Directive
No. 301 of 1988 in Treaty of Rome Article 90 (Consolidated EC Treaty Article 86)).
141. Commission Directive No. 88/301, O.J. L 131/73 (1988).
142. Council Directive No. 90/387, O.J. L 192/1 (1990).
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* Commission Directive No. 388 of June 28, 1990 mandat-
ing competition in telecommunications services other
than general voice telephony, 14 but requiring that com-
petitive provision of voice telephony be allowed to closed
groups;1
44
* Commission Directive No. 46 of October 18, 1994 man-
dating competition for earth station satellite equipment
and satellite communication services; 145
* Commission Directive No. 51 of October 18, 1995 man-
dating provision for competitive cable television net-
works and imposing accounting separation requirements
for telecommunications and cable television networks
operators; 146 and
* Commission Directive No. 19 of March 13, 1996, which
amended Directive No. 388 of 1990 to mandate competi-
tion in voice telephony effective January 1, 1998.141
These Directives represent the first serious Community attempt
to challenge the existence of national telecommunication mo-
nopolies previously allowed under Treaty of Rome Article 90 (2)
(Treaty of Amsterdam Article 86(2) ).148 From 1988 to 1996,
these directives progressively mandated a growing degree of
competition. They broadly coincide with the opening of the in-
ternational telecommunications markets to competition sought
in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and culminated in
the 1997 Group on Basic Telecommunications Agreement1 49
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. By this
agreement, sixty-eight countries, including the EU, which ac-
143. Commission Directive No. 90/388, O.J. L 192/10 (1990).
144. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 192/10, at 15.
145. Commission Directive No. 94/46, O.J. L 268/15 (1994) (amending Directive
No. 88/301 and 90/388 with regard to satellite communications).
146. Commission Directive No. 95/51, Oj. L 256/49 (1995) (amending directive
No. 388 of 1990 with regard to abolition of restrictions on the use of cable television
networks for provision of previously liberalized telecommunication services).
147. Commission Directive No. 96/19, O.J. L 74/13 (1996).
148. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 90(2), 298 U.N.T.S. at 50; Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 86(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 210 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 94 (ex Article
90).
149. World Trade Organization Group on Basic Telecommunications Report, Feb.
15, 1997, WTO Doc. No. S/GBT/4 (visited on Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/
services/tell5.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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count for the vast majority of international telecommunication
activity, agreed to open their national markets to competition. 150
The 1988 and 1990 Directives restricted Member State regu-
lation to the minimum necessary to assure security and integrity
of network operations, and inter-operability of services and data
protection.15 1 They required Member States to separate regula-
tory and operational functions concerning the provision of ser-
vice.152 Perhaps the largest incremental opening to competition
was the leap to contemplating competition in voice telephony,
previously excluded from competition on the ground that the
revenues derived from it were necessary to build national tele-
communication networks and to subsidize the universal service
and other public welfare aspects of the State telecommunication
monopolies protected under Treaty of Rome Article 90(2)
(Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 86(2)).
Directive No. 387 of 1990 mandated Member State action to
liberalize public networks, defined as the telecommunication in-
frastructure that permits the conveyance of signals between de-
fined network termination points by wires, microwave, optical
means, or other electromagnetic means.'53 This Directive man-
dated access to public networks by other operators pursuant to
objective, non-discriminatory, and transparent criteria.' 54 Direc-
tive No. 19 of 1996 required:
* removal of all restrictions relative to access public voice
telephony telecommunication networks as of January 1,
1998, with an additional five-year transition period for
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, and a two-year
transition period for Luxembourg;' 55
* establishment of a universal service fund financed by all
150. Phillip L. Spector, The World Trade Organization Agreement on Telecommunica-
tions, 32 INT'L LAw. 217, 217 (1998); Federal Communications Commissioner ("FCC")
Susan Ness, International Telecommunications: An Opportunity for U.S. and EU Joint
Leadership, Remarks Before the European Institute (Jan. 12, 1999) <http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Ness/spsn902.txt> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
151. Commission Directive No. 90/388, art. 3, O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
152. Council Directive No. 88/301, art. 6, O.J. L 131/73, at 76 (1988).
153. Council Directive No. 90/387, art. 1, O.J. L 192/1, at 2 (1990).
154. Id. Article 1 of Directive No. 387 of 1990 defines "[o ] pen network provisions
conditions" as the conditions, harmonized according to the directive, which concern
open and efficient access to public telecommunication networks. Id.
155. Commission Directive No. 96/19, O.J. L 74/13 (1996).
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markets;15 6 and
limitation of national licensing requirements to authori-
zation or declaration procedures, with compulsory third
party interconnection access based on principles of ob-
jectivity, non-discrimination, proportionality, and trans-
parency, together with suitable procedures to appeal any
denial. 157
Directive No. 19 of 1996 also requires entities that provide both
voice telephony and other services to maintain separate account-
ing for such services. 158
IV. ITALY'S INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
Against the background of Community Directives on elec-
tricity and telecommunications for the creation of market struc-
tures to allow competition, Italy has created and relied upon a
series of independent regulatory commissions novel for its legal
system. These so-called Authorities share common characteris-
tics. Their governing boards are named for relatively long terms
by a process designed to prevent them from becoming part of
the Italian system of political patronage. 59 They are intended to
have independent expertise. 6  They have independent
rulemaking and enforcement authority,1 6 and are subject to at
156. Id. art. 1(3), O.J. L 74/13, at 22 (1996).
157. Id.
158. Id. art. 1(8), O.J. L 74/13, at 24 (1996).
159. See Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974, (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 149 (June 8, 1974)
(stating Commissione Nazionale per le Societi e la Borsa (National Commission for
Companies and the Stock Exchange ("CONSOB") members have five year terms); Law
No. 287 of October 10, 1990, art. 10(2), (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 240 (Oct. 13, 1990) (stating
that Antitrust Authority members have seven year terms); Law No. 481 of November 14,
1995, art. 2(8), (It.), supp. ord. No. 136 to Gazz. Uff. No. 270 (Nov. 18, 1995) (stating
that Authority for Electric Energy and Gas members have seven year terms); Law No.
249 of July 31, 1997, arts. 1, pt. 3, 1.5, (It.), supp. ord. No. 154/L to Gazz. Uff. No. 177
(July 31, 1997) (noting that AGC members have seven year terms).
160. Law No. 216 ofJune 7, 1974, art. 1, pt. 3 (CONSOB); Law No. 287 of October
10, 1990, art. 10 (Antitrust Authority); Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 2(8)
(Authority for Electric Energy and Gas); Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 1(3) (AGC).
161. Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974, art. 1, pt. 9 (defining rulemaking power of
CONSOB); Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, art. 14-19 (defining rulemaking power of
Antitrust Authority); Law No. 481 of 1995, art. 2(5), (12) (defining rulemaking power
of Authority for Electric Energy and Gas); Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 1(6) (a)
(defining rulemaking power of Authority for Guarantees in Telecommunications (or
"AGC").
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most limited control by the executive. 1 62 Their actions are gen-
erally appealable only to the administrative courts, 163 unlike ac-
tions of the traditional parts of the Italian public administration,
against which appeal to a higher administrative authority is typi-
cally available. A few words about each of the reievant Authori-
ties follow.
A. CONSOB-Securities Regulatory Commission
A 1974 Italian law164 provided for the creation of CONSOB
to "return the trust of the public to stock investment."165 Prior
to CONSOB's creation, the relevant Civil Code provisions had
left the burden of investigation of corporate financial status on
the prospective shareholder.166 CONSOB is the first institution
in Italy designed to assure corporate disclosure of information
material to shareholder investment decisions. From an initial fo-
cus on disclosure requirements for stock exchange listed compa-
nies, 16 7 CONSOB's activity has been legislatively broadened to
162. See Law No. 216 of 1974, art. 1, pt. 9 (explaining that orders of CONSOB
become executory if not contested by executive within 20 days from their submission by
CONSOB to prime minister); Law No. 287 of 1990, art. 16 (describing Antitrust Author-
ity investigation and mandatory orders against concentrations); Law No. 481 of 1995,
art. 1(12),(13) (explaining how electricity prices set by Authority for Electric Energy
and Gas can be overturned by Cabinet only for "serious and relevant reasons for the
public good"); Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 1(27) (stating that AGC orders are
subject only to administrative judicial review).
163. II FRANCESCO GALGANO, DIRITrO COMMERCIALE 376 (4th ed. 1993) (CONSOB
administrative court appeals); Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, art. 33 (Antitrust Au-
thority administrative court appeals); Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, Art. 25 (creat-
ing Authority for Electric Energy and Gas administrative court appeals); Law No. 249 of
1997, art. 1(26) (creating Authority for Guarantees in Communications administrative
court appeals).
164. Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974, (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 149 (June 8, 1974). See
Giuseppe SbisA, I Controlli della Consob, in COMMENTARIO AL CODICE CIVILE SCIALOJA-
BRANCA, LIBRO QUINTO, LAVORO, TITOLO V, CAPo V: DELLA SOCIETA PER AZIONI 5
(Supp. 1998). CONSOB's website is <http://www.consob.it>.
165. GOVERNMENT REPORT TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOR CONVERSION OF LEGIS-
LATIVE DECREE No. 95 OF APRIL 8, 1974 iNro LAw.
166. CODICE CIVILE §§ 2363-2409 (It.).
167. Legislative Decree No. 136 of March 31, 1975 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 119 (May 7,
1975) (containing accounting and balance sheet certification requirements for compa-
nies listed on stock exchange); Legislative Decree No. 137 of March 31, 1975 (It.), Gazz.
Uff. No. 119 (May 7, 1975) (containing rules regarding profit and loss statements of
credit companies and regulation of insurance companies and financial institutions);
Legislative Decree No. 138 of March 31, 1975 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 119 (May 7, 1975)
(containing CONSOB rulemaking power relative to requirements for companies listed
on stock exchange).
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include regulation of trading in unlisted securities,a68 insurance
companies, 169 regulation of the characteristics of securities
themselves 17' as well as of the disclosure of information by issu-
ers, mutual funds,1 7 1 and in 1991 when insider trading first be-
came specifically illegal in Italy, insider trading. 72 Of relevance
to the Telecom Italia takeover battle discussed below, CONSOB
regulates takeover bids 73 and holdings of large blocks of
stock. ' 74
CONSOB was the first Italian independent regulatory com-
mission. Its governance has been legislatively re-tuned from its
creation, 75 but remains faithful to the premise that CONSOB is
an autonomous, expert regulatory body. The Antitrust Author-
ity, the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, and the Authority
for Guarantees in Telecommunications are generally modeled
on the structure of CONSOB.
CONSOB is headquartered in Rome and has an operating
post office in Milan. Its four members and president are chosen
among experts in their field and appointed by the President of
the Republic based on proposal by the Prime Minister after cabi-
net deliberation. 176 The selection process is meant to insure the
political independence of the members. The members hold of-
168. Law No. 49 of February 23, 1977 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 60 (Mar. 3, 1977) (stat-
ing that unlisted securities-mercato ristretto--are subject to CONSOB jurisdiction).
169. See Law No. 576 of August 12, 1982 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 229 (Aug. 20, 1982)
(stating that insurance companies are subject to CONSOB jurisdiction).
170. See Law No. 102 of June 19, 1991 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 75 (Mar. 29, 1991)
(concerning sales of securities).
171. Law No. 77 of March 23, 1983 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 85 (Mar. 28, 1983).
172. See Law No. 57 of February 26, 1991 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 51 (Mar. 1, 1991)
(concerning insider trading).
173. See Legislative Decree No. 9 of January 27, 1992 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 37
(Feb. 14, 1992) (implementing Council Directive No. 88/627, O.J. L 348/62 (1998)
relative to disclosure requirements for purchase and sale of significant corporate own-
ership interests).
174. See Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974, art. 5 (as modified by Law No. 281 ofJune 4,
1985, art. 1) (reporting obligations for ownership of more than 2% of listed company
or 10% of unlisted company); Id. art. 5 (reporting obligations of participation at thresh-
olds of 10, 20, 33, 50, or 75% of listed company); Law No. 216 ofJune 7, 1974, art. 18-18
septies (It.) (as modified by law No. 474 of July 30, 1994), Gazz. Uff. No. 177 (July 30,
1994) (containing reporting and prospectus obligations for tender and initial public
offerings).
175. Law No. 281 of June 4, 1985 (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 142 (June 18,
1985) (regarding CONSOB governance).
176. Law No. 216 of 1974, art. 1, pt. 3.
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ice for one five-year term, with possibility of one renewal. 177
CONSOB's four members and president adopt rules and en-
forcement measures collegially. 17  The CONSOB president is re-
sponsible for oversight of its investigation and enforcement activ-
ity. CONSOB's final decisions are appealable to the Lombardia
regional administrative tribunal for decisions issued in Milan,
and Lazio for decisions issued in Rome-with final appeal to the
Council of State. 179
Although the Treasury Ministry oversees CONSOB,"8 ° CON-
SOB is an independent, autonomous agency. 81  Executive
branch control over CONSOB's actions is limited to:
* appointment of members and determination of their
compensation; 1
82
* dissolution of CONSOB in case of deadlock; 83 and
* procedural control of how CONSOB manages its inter-
nal resources. 18
4
B. Antitrust Authority
Until adoption of the 1990 law providing for creation of the
Antitrust Authority,"8 5 Italy had no antitrust law other than
through Treaty of Rome Articles 85 and 86 (Treaty of Amster-
dam, Articles 81 and 82). Italy's antitrust law closely follows the
Treaty of Rome and the Community's so-called Merger Regula-
tion regarding to concentrations of enterprises. 8 6 Indeed, It-
aly's antitrust law adopts Community antitrust law principles to
resolve Italian issues even when the Italian issues do not meet
the size thresholds that Community antitrust law sets for its own
application.'1 7
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 1, pt. 6.
179. GALGANO, supra note 163, at 376.
180. Law No. 216 of 1974, art. 1, pt. 6.
181. Id. art. 1(1), pt. 2.
182. Id. art. 1, pts. 3, 4.
183. Id. art. 1, pt. 14.
184. Id. art. 1, pts. 8, 9.
185. Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 240 (Oct. 13, 1990).
186. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989) amended by Council
Regulation No. 1310/97, OJ. L 180/1 (1997).187. Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, (It.) Gazz. Uff. No. 240 (Oct.
13, 1990).
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The Antitrust Authority (AutoritA Garante della Concor-
renza e del Mercato),18s headquartered in Rome, regulates:
* agreements that restrict or may restrict competition;
* abuses of dominant position;
* concentrations of enterprises restricting competition; 8 9
and
" misleading advertising. 90
The Antitrust Authority is "independent and autonomous from
the executive power. " 19' The Antitrust Authority is comprised of
one president and four members appointed jointly by the presi-
dents of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate.
The Antitrust Authority president is appointed by persons of
well-known independence, and who have already held high of-
fice with broadly based institutional responsibilities. 9 2 The
members are chosen among judges of the Council of State,
Court of Accounts, Court of Cassation, full professors of eco-
nomics or law, and business executives of particularly high pro-
fessional repute. 9 ' The president and members are appointed
for a non-renewable term of seven years. They may not exercise
any professional or consulting activities or be employed or act as
members of any board of directors or hold public office during
their term.'9 4 The Antitrust Authority is also subject to internal
ethics rules concerning gifts and conflicts of interest.9 5
The Antitrust Authority may, in case of agreements, concen-
trations, and abuses of dominant position that restrict competi-
tion:
* assess fines;
188. The Antitrust Authority's website is <http://www.agcm.it>.
189. Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 240 (Oct. 13, 1990).
190. Legislative Decree No. 74 ofJanuary 25, 1992 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 36 (Feb. 13,
1992).
191. Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, art. 10.
192. Id.
193. Id. art. 10(2).
194. Id. art. 10(3).
195. PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND
PUBUCATIONS, ANTITRUST A PORTATA DI MANo 8 (1999) (visited on Feb. 11, 2000)
<http://www.agcm.it/AGCMENG/OPUSCOL/EFUNZ.NSF/mainview> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
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" issue orders enjoining anti-competitive activity;196 and
* in case of failure to make a required notification of a
concentration, order the suspension of all of its activi-
ties, prohibit the concentration or order the parties in-
volved to remove its effects.
197
Antitrust Authority decisions are appealable to the administra-
tive courts, specifically the Lazio regional administrative tribu-
nal, 98 with final appeal to the.Council of State.1 99
C. The Twin Law No. 481 of 1995 Authorities: Electricity and
Natural Gas (alive); Telecommunications (never born, but
Reincarnated as the AGC)
With the benefit of the CONSOB and Antitrust Authority
experiences, Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995,200 entitled
"rules for competition and regulation of services of public utility;
institution of the authorities for public utility regulation," pro-
vided for establishment of the Authority for Electric Energy and
Gas and of a Telecommunications Authority. It provided that
"the Authorities operate in full autonomy and with indepen-
dence ofjudgment and evaluation; they are dedicated to regula-
tion and control of the sector of their competence."201
The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, with headquar-
ters in Milan, in fact exists.2 0 2 It began operation in spring 1997,
a year and a half after the time fixed for its constitution by Law
No. 481 of 1995. The Telecommunications Authority was not
created. As discussed below, in 1998 the Authority for Guaran-
tees in Communications began operation pursuant to a 1997 law
that builds upon the concepts of Law No. 481 of 1995.
A principal responsibility of each of the two Authorities was
to set rates,203 subject in the case of the Authority for Electric
Energy and Gas to the significant constraint that tariffs in the
196. Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, arts. 17, 18.
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 33.
199. Id.
200. Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995 (It.), supp. ord. no. 136 to Gazz. Uff.
No. 270 (Nov. 18, 1995).
201. Id. art. 2(5).
202. The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas website is <http://
www.autorita.energia.it>.
203. Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 2(10)(e).
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supply of electricity be categorically uniform throughout the na-
tional territory.2° 4 Each Authority was also to propose to the
competent ministry how to handle changes in concessions, au-
thorizations, contracts, and programmatic agreements, both in-
dividually and collectively.205 If the competent minister rejected
such a proposal, then the Authority could re-propose. To over-
rule the re-proposal, the law provides that the competent minis-
ter may propose to the Prime Minister that the Council of Minis-
ters decide otherwise, but only for "serious and relevant reasons
of general utility. '2 6 As to competition issues, each Authority
was to refer competition law matters to the Antitrust Authority,
which had to respond with its opinion within thirty days.20 7
The mechanism for nomination of Antitrust Authority
members was designed to produce a broad consensus as to their
suitability for the office. The Antitrust Authority was to have a
president and two members, nominated by decree of the Presi-
dent of the Republic following deliberation of the Council of
Ministers on proposal of the competent Minister.20 ' A further
requirement for nomination is that the candidate receive ap-
proval of the competent Parliamentary Commission. 20 9 Hear-
ings on nominees before the Parliamentary Commissions are
contemplated.2 10 The term of office of the authority's president
and members is seven years, which is not non-renewable.211
They may not have other employment during their term. Con-
flict of interest rules exist during the member's term in office to
avoid former members from having any ability to profit from
their term of office. 212 For four years after leaving office, em-
ployment by regulated entities is prohibited.2 1 3 Penalties in-
clude fines ensuring forfeit of compensation.2 14 For the entre-
204. Id. art. 3(2).
205. Id. arts. 2(12)(b), (d), (o).
206. Id. art. 2(13).
207. Id. art. 2(34).
208. Id. art. 2(7).
209. Id. art. 2(7). The Senate Commission to oversee public works and communi-
cations is composed of 28 members proportionally representing 10 parties present in
the Senate. Members' names and party affiliations are available on the Italian Senate's
website at <http://www.senato.it/leg/13/Bgt/Schede/Commissioni/0-00008.htm>.
210. Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, art. 2(7).
211. Id. art. 2(8).
212. Id. art. 2(9).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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preneur engaging a former Authority member, contemplated
penalties include administrative fines equal to 0.5% of revenues,
but not less than 300 million lira or more than 200 billion lira,
and in the most serious repeated cases, revocation of the author-
ization or act granted. 1 The monetary amounts mentioned are
indexed to inflation.216
Further guarantees exist relating to the autonomy of each
Authority's operation and staffing. Each Authority was to have
organizational, accounting, and administrative autonomy. 217
The staff of each Authority was to come in part from a competi-
tive public examination 2"8 and in part through the engagement
of a limited number of external consultants.219 This staffing
mechanism was to isolate the Authority staff from the traditional
State bureaucracy and strike a balance between the competing
concerns of avoiding patronage, while having access to the eco-
nomic and legal analysis skills required for the Authorities' mis-
sions. Appeals of Authority for Electric Energy and Gas deci-
sions are made to the Lombardia regional administrative tribu-
nal, subject to further appeal to the Council of State.22 °
D. Authority for Guarantees in Communications
The Authority for Guarantees in Communications, AutoritAt
per le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni, was established by Law
No. 249 of 1997221 as the independent regulator of telecommu-
nications and broadcasting, and became operational in mid-
1998. It substitutes the never instituted Authority for Telecom-
munications contemplated by Law No. 481 of 1995. Law No. 249
of 1997 reworks the concept of the Authority for Telecommuni-
cations to include both telecommunication and broadcast regu-
latory responsibilities. The focus here is on the structure of the
AGC and its telecommunication regulatory responsibilities as il-
lustrations of Italy's maturing response to Community law.222
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. art. 2(27).
218. Id. art. 2(28).
219. Id. art. 2(30).
220. Id. art. 25.
221. Law No. 249 ofJuly 31, 1997 (It.), supp. ord. no. 154/L to Gazz. Uff. No. 177
(July 31, 1997). The AGC's website is <http://www.agcom.it>.
222. For a fuller perspective on the AGC and its broadcast regulatory role, see
2000] ITALY'S RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 583
The AGC's telecommunication regulatory responsibilities ad-
dressed here include resetting of tariffs, issuance of licenses and
authorizations relative to telecommunication infrastructure and
services, and regulation of interconnections to telecommunica-
tion networks.
Law No. 249 of 1997 adopts many of the provisions of Law
No. 481 of 1995 by express reference or by restating its con-
cepts. 223 Examples include the adoption of the Law No. 481 of
1995 approach to conflicts of interest for the members of the
Authority for Electric Energy and Gas and provision for staffing
so as to maintain independence, both from the regulated indus-
try and from the traditional civil service. 24
The AGC is based in Naples, with a representative office in
Rome. Since its first year of operation, the AGC has addressed
several important regulatory topics, 225 including the re-balanc-
ing of tariffs for voice services between national and interna-
tional calls, business and residential customers, and local and
long distance calls;22 6 interconnection arrangements; 22 17 and li-
censing procedures. 28
Like the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, the AGC is
to operate in full autonomy and with independence ofjudgment
and evaluation. 29 Unlike the Authority for Electric Energy and
Gas, the law that creates the AGC contemplates some internal
structure, 230 namely,
" a president;
" a commission for infrastructures and networks;
* a commission for services and products; and
Fabio Bassan, La Riforma Italiana delle Telecomunicazioni: Profili Generali, 12 DiiTrO DEL
COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 3 (1998).
223. See, e.g., Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 1(6)(c)(14). The Council of the
AGC "exercises all the other functions and powers contemplated in law No. 481 of
November 14, 1995, as well as all the other functions of the AGC not expressly attrib-
uted to the commission for infrastructures and grids and to the commission for services
and products." Id.
224. Id. art. 1(3), (5).
225. The AGC's website offers current summaries of its achievements.
226. Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 4.
227. Id. art. 5.
228. Id. art. 4(3).
229. Id. art. 1(1).
230. Id. art. 1(3).
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0 a plenary council.
The president presides over each commission, which is com-
prised of four commissioners. The plenary council is comprised
of the president and all the commissioners.
Although the mechanism for selecting AGC members is
mildly different than that of the selection of members of the
other Authorities, its purpose nonetheless is to limit the
politicization of the nomination process.2 3' The Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies each elect four members of the AGC.
Each senator and each deputy are to vote for one member of the
infrastructures and networks commission and one member of
the commission for services and products. The President of the
Republic names the president of the AGC on proposal from the
Prime Minister, in agreement with the Minister of Communica-
tions.
Among its responsibilities, the commission for infrastruc-
tures and networks defines "objective and transparent criteria,
including with reference to maximum tariffs, for interconnec-
tion and for access to telecommunication infrastructures accord-
ing to criteria of nondiscrimination, 232 and resolves intercon-
nection controversies within ninety days of notification. 233
Among the responsibilities of the commission for services and
products are the maintenance of quality, service standards, and
matters related to advertising and marketing.3 4
The council is responsible for the adoption of regulations,
including license grants and authorizations for both telecommu-
nications and broadcasting. The Ministry of Communications
retains authority for granting broadcasting concessions and au-
thorizations. 235 The AGC must express its opinion within thirty
days of receipt of measures adopted by the Antitrust Authority
concerning communication sector operators, without which the
measures then take effect. 2 3 6
To a greater degree than the laws instituting the other Au-
thorities, the AGC's instituting law addresses public participation
231. Id.
232. Id. art. 1 (a) (7).
233. Id. art. 1 (a) (9).
234. Id. art. 1(b).
235. Id. art. 1 (c).
236. Id. art. 1(5).
2000] ITALY'S RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 585
and dispute resolution issues. Any bearer of public or private
interests, as well as holders of diffuse interests constituted in as-
sociations or committees who might be damaged by an AGC
measure, may intervene in AGC proceedings to challenge the
measure. 217 Moreover, the AGC is to offer non-judicial dispute
resolution procedures for disputes between users or categories
of users and a license or authorization holder, as well as disputes
among license and authorization holders. In any event, legal ac-
tion is prohibited until failure of a mandatory conciliation at-
tempt during the thirty days following notice to the AGC.2 3 s
Challenges to AGC measures are made to the Lazio admin-
.istrative regional tribunal, notwithstanding the AGC's Naples
headquarters location. 239 Further appeals are made to the
Council of State. Before both of the Lazio regional administra-
tive tribunal and the Council of State, accelerated procedures
apply for AGC challenges.240
The law creating the AGC contains a substantive antitrust
standard: "In the sectors of sound and television communica-
tions, including in evolved forms, realized with any technical
means, multimedia, publishing, including electronic publishing
and the related sources of financing, any act or behavior having
as object or effect the constitution or maintenance of a domi-
nant position is prohibited."24 1 The consequence of violating
this prohibition is the nullity of the offending acts and agree-
ments. 242 Actors operating in the referenced subject areas must
communicate to the AGC and the Antitrust Authority concentra-
tion "agreements and transactions" to which they are party.
V. ELECTRIC SECTOR
The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, the Antitrust Au-
thority, and, to a lesser degree, CONSOB, have been instrumen-
tal in how the liberalization of Italy's electricity markets has un-
folded. At the beginning of the 1990s, there was much discus-
sion of the "privatization" of ENEL and other State-held
237. Id. art. 1(10).
238. Id. art. 1(11).
239. Id. art. 1(26).
240. Id. art. 1(27).
241. Id. art. 2(1).
242. Id. art. 2(2).
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enterprises.243 These enterprises at the time represented a sub-
stantial portion of Italy's economy. 2" The prevailing thought
appeared to be that the shares of ENEL would be sold in whole
or in part to the private sector, possibly with retention by the
public sector of some form of so-called "golden share" providing
continued government control rights in areas such as approval
of other shareholders, major corporate transactions, and the
like. Indeed, Italian law gives the government the option to
maintain ongoing rights in formerly State-held enterprises so as
to veto further transfers of ownership of the privatized enter-
prise even after the government no longer holds a majority inter-
est.245 These lingering rights are known as "golden share rights.".
243. See Decree No. 333 of July 11, 1992 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 162 (July 11, 1992),
converted into law with modifications by Law No. 359 of August 8, 1992, Gazz. Uff.
No. 190 (Aug. 13, 1992) (transforming principal state held entities, including ENEL, oil
and gas conglomerate ENI, and government holding company IRI, into private law cor-
porations owned by Treasury Ministry in anticipation of their sale); see also Law No. 537
of December 24, 1993 (It.), supp. ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 303 (Dec. 28, 1993) (delegating
to Italian government power to issue decrees to establish regulatory authorities to over-
see privatized entities formerly controlled by government ministries, but no such de-
crees were issued); Law No. 474 ofJuly 30, 1994 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 177 (July 30, 1994)
(conditioning sale of state interests in public utility companies on creation of independ-
ent authorities to regulate relevant sector). Law No. 481 of November 14, 1995, dis-
cussed below, provided for the creation of the Authorities for Electric Energy and Gas
and for Telecommunications, and Law No. 249 of 1997, also discussed below, created
the Authority for Guarantees in Communications. The multi-year course of the prepa-
rations for action reflects the coalition character of Italy's government during the rele-
vant period. Nonetheless, Italy's privatization efforts have built to a crescendo. OECD
in Figures (visited on Feb. 11. 2000) <http://oecd.org/publications/figures/e_87_oif-
graphprivatisation.pdf> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinaf-
ter OECD in Figures]. In 1998, Italy raised more gross revenue from privatization,
US$13.6 billion, than any other OECD member state. OECD in Figures, supra. Signifi-
cant privatizations included IMI S.p.A. (securities), INA S.p.A. (insurance), ENI S.p.A.
(oil), Telecom Italia S.p.A., Banca Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.A. (bank), and recently, in
one of the largest public offerings ever, a minority stake in ENEL, S.p.A. As of Novem-
ber 2, 1999, 34.6% of ENEL was sold to the public, and ENEL is listed on both the
Italian and New York Stock Exchanges. ENEL, 3.8 Million di Azionisti, LA REPUBBLICA,
Nov. 1, 1999, at 2; World Record ENEL IPO, PRIVATISATION INr'L, Dec. 1999.
244. This amounts to 12.9% of Italian gross domestic investment, as compared to
6.4% for the United Kingdom, and 2.1% for the United States, each for 1985-1990. See
World Bank, World Economic Indicators for the Period 1985-1990, at 299, (visited on
Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
245. Decree Law No. 332 of May 31, 1994, art. 1(3) (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 332 (May
31, 1994), converted into law by Law No. 474 of July 30, 1994, Gazz. Uff. No. 177
(July 30, 1994).
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With the 1999 adoption of the Bersani Decree 24 6 concerning the
restructuring of ENEL and of Italian electric markets to imple-
ment the relevant Community Directive on the liberalization of
the electric power sector,24 7 it is clear that this elementary trad-
ing of government-for-private ownership of a national electric
monopoly will not occur. What the Bersani Decree contem-
plates is a structure for:
* a competitive market in the generation and supply of
electricity;
" an essentially national transmission monopoly; and
* local monopolies in distribution.
Although the Italian State, for the moment, continues248 to con-
trol ENEL, the ENEL that now exists and that will emerge from
the implementation of the Bersani Decree over a period of years
is an ENEL quite different in substance and structure from that
which existed when the Italian privatization debates began.
A. Bersani Decree: The New Rules
The Bersani Decree became effective April 1, 1999 as Italian
Legislative Decree No. 79 of March 16, 1999.249 The Bersani De-
cree mandates:
* dismantling ENEL S.p.A.'s integrated electric monopoly;
* division of ENEL into several companies; and
* sale of 15,000 MW of ENEL capacity to third parties.
246. Legislative Decree No. 79 of Mar. 16, 1999 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 79 (Mar. 31,
1999).
247. Council Directive No. 96/92, OJ. L 27/20 (1997).
248. As to ENEL S.p.A., the Italian state maintains a so-called "golden share" in
addition to its present majority ownership. ENEL PROSPECrUS, supra note 12, at 117.
ENEL's bylaws give the Treasury Ministry approval power over material ownership inter-
ests in ENEL, defined as more than three percent. The Treasury Ministry also has ap-
proval rights over shareholder agreements involving more than five percent of share
capital, as well as the right to veto significant changes in the business. Id. at 125. David
Lane, Setback for Investors asENEL Share Price Drops, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Feb. 2000, at 27.
249. Bersani Decree, supra note 43. For practitioner essays in English on these
developments see Patrick Del Duca & Duccio Mortillaro, Electric Sector Opportunities in
Italy, PROJ. FIN. MTHLY, Jan. 1999, at 3; Silvia Pariente-David & Denis Depoux, Italy: A
Land of Opportunity, POWER ECON., Mar. 31, 1999, at 20; David Lane, Italy Plans Sales of
Power Firms, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Sept. 1999, at 12; Italian Power Shakeup Approved, PROJ.
FIN. INT'L, Mar. 10, 1999, at 34; Marco Denes, Italian Power: Happy Hangover, PRoj. FIN.,
Nov. 1999, at 24.
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The Ministry of Industry, by a decree of September 24, 1996,
constituted a "Consultative Commission for the identification of
methods, procedures, priorities and of choices most suitable for
the purposes of promoting the liberalization in the Italian en-
ergy market, the progressive competition among producers, the
best guarantees in favor of users and environmental protection."
The Commission, chaired by Umberto Carpi, an Italian senator
and undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry, adopted its re-
port January 28, 1997. Its work included guidelines on how to
implement Directive No. 92 of 1996 in Italy, which the Bersani
Decree in large measure followed. It endorsed not only the
eventual separation of ENEL into generation, transmission, and
distribution companies, but also the creation of a number of
generation companies. Further, it asserted that a multiplicity of
companies eventually would favor greater competition and allow
incremental, and therefore more rapid, privatizations.
Broadly, the Bersani Decree follows the California model of
an independent system operator and a power exchange. 250 But,
it does so through the lenses of parallel restricted and competi-
tive markets, as permitted by Directive No. 92 of 1996.
Pursuant to the Bersani Decree, the activities of production,
import, export, purchase, and sale of electric energy no longer
require special authorization. 251 Transmission and dispatching
are reserved to the state and attributed in concession to the
newly created manager of the national transmission grid.2 52 Dis-
tribution is pursuant to concession granted by the Minister of
Industry. 253
1. Two Markets: Restricted and Competitive
The Bersani Decree contemplates parallel restricted and
competitive markets as follows:
* sales to consumers whose requirements are below 30
GWh per year, reduced to 20 GWh January 1, 2000, and
9 GWh in 2002, known as so-called "restricted custom-
250. For an assessment of California's experience, see Robert L. Earle, et al., Les-
sons from the First Year of Competition in the California Electricity Markets, ElucrncrnJ., Oct.
1999, at 57.
251. See Bersani Decree, supra note 43, art. 1(1).
252. Id. art. 1(1).
253. Id.
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ers; "254 and
* other sales, to so-called "qualified customers." 255
For restricted customers, the Bersani Decree creates a new "Sin-
gle Purchaser" company.256 The Single Purchaser is owned by
the National Transmission Manager and hence is under govern-
ment ownership. 257 The Single Purchaser entity buys all power
intended for consumption in Italy, except the power to be con-
sumed in the competitive market. The Single Purchaser,
through distributors, is the only source of power for restricted
customers. It sells its power to distribution companies at a price
such that the end users perceive only the uniform national price
for electricity set by the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas.
258
Deregulation does not directly affect restricted customers. The
tariffs that the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas allow to be
charged to restricted consumers constrain what the Single Pur-
chaser can pay to producers and importers of electricity.
Qualified customers are:211
* distributors;
" wholesalers;
* extraterritorial consumers or suppliers; and
* companies and consortia that consume at least 30 GWh
per year, with at least 2 GWh in the same municipality on
the Bersani Decree's effective date, reduced to 20 GWh
per year and 1 GWh consumption in the same munici-
pality on January 1, 2000, and 9 GWh per year and 1
GWh consumption, on January 1, 2002.
Generators of electricity may contract directly with qualified cus-
tomers.2 60 Although the terms of such contracts must conform
with the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas requirements im-
posed for the "correct functioning of the entire electric system,"
there is a presumption in favor of Authority authorization of
254. Id. art. 2(7).
255. Id. art. 2(6).
256. Id. art. 4 (constituted as Acquirente Unico, S.p.A).
257. Id. art. 4(1). Minority interests consistent with the maintenance of state own-
ership control may be sold to distribution companies. Id.
258. Id. arts. 1(7), 4(6).
259. Id. arts. 14(1), (2), (3), (4).
260. Id. art. 6.
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such contracts. 261 The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas will
oversee such contracts. The Minister of Industry may expand
the universe of qualified customers if the following thresholds
for open market shares are not met: thirty percent on Febru-
ary 19, 1999, thirty-five percent on January 1, 2000, and forty per-
cent on January 1, 2002.262
2. ENEL Reorganization
The Bersani Decree has mandated reorganization of ENEL
into a holding company. The initial subsidiary companies, sub-
sequently to be sold, are:
a generation company, which may own generation facili-
ties outright or through special purpose companies, per-
haps partly owned with other investors. Among its initial
tasks, the company will be to sell 15,000 MW of ENEL's
aging generating capacity in the next five years;
* a distribution company, which like the generation com-
pany may own distribution assets outright or through
special purpose companies, perhaps partly owned with
other investors;
* a company for sales to qualified customers, which like
the generation company, may also act through special
purpose companies, perhaps owned with others; and
* a transmission company, to own the transmission net-
work.268
3. Generation, Transmission, and Distribution
The Bersani Decree mandates, that by January 1, 2003 no
entity may produce or import, directly or indirectly, more than
fifty percent of Italy's total electric power.2 " The Authority for
Electric Energy and Gas may grant a one year extension of this
deadline. 265 By January 1, 2003, ENEL must also have sold at
least 15,000 MW of its production capacity. 266
261. Id. art. 6(2).
262. Id. art. 14(5).
263. Id. art. 13.
264. Id. art. 8(1).
265. Id. art. 8(2).
266. Id. art. 8(1).
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The Bersani Decree contemplates establishment of a Na-
tional Transmission Manager, Ente Gestore della Rete di Tras-
missione Nazionale S.p.A., responsible for transmission.267 This
entity, a state owned private law corporation,268 is to provide uni-
versal service. 269 The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas is to
oversee the National Transmission Manager's activities. Private
parties may manage the limited portions of the transmission net-
work not functional to the transmission network as a whole.27 °
The National Transmission Manager may engage third parties to
work under its direction to maintain the network.271
The Bersani Decree contemplates that distribution conces-
sions in effect prior to its effective date of April 1, 1999 continue
through December 31, 2030.272 ENEL received a concession in
1995 that included distribution to almost all of Italy, except for
parts of some major urban areas served by municipal companies
and some remote areas.27 3 That concession was originally to ex-
pire in 2032, but would appear to be modified by the Bersani
Decree to run through the December 31, 2030 date. The distri-
bution company to be spun off from ENEL will inherit ENEL's
distribution concession. For concessions issued after December
31, 2030, the Bersani Decree contemplates that the Ministry of
Industry will establish bidding regulations that: (1) provide
compensation of investments made by the previous concession
holder; (2) mandate that coverage of a concession be no less
than the territory of a municipality and no more than one-fourth
of final consumers nationally; (3) establish bid qualification re-
quirements; and (4) require that only one concession per mu-
nicipality be issued.274 The Bersani Decree contemplates mecha-
nisms in the near future for Italy's limited number of municipal
and other non-ENEL electricity distributors to take full control
of distribution in the municipalities in which they predominate,
as well as to raise capital for such purposes. 275
267. Id. art. 3(1).
268. Id. art. 3(4).
269. Id. art. 3(1).
270. Id. art. 3(7).
271. Id. art. 3(8).
272. Id. art. 9.
273. Ministry of Industry Decree of December 28, 1995 (It.), supp. ord. No. 41 to
Gazz. Uff. No. 39 (Feb. 16, 1996) (awarding ENEL 40 year concession).
274. See Bersani Decree, supra note 43, art. 9(2).
275. Id. arts. 9(3), (4), (7).
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The Market Operator is to be a corporation independent of
power producers and distributors, so as to ensure its neutral-
ity.27 6 The National Transmission Manager will be its initial
owner. 27 7 The Market Operator will make a market for electric-
ity in the competitive part of the Italian electric sector. Ulti-
mately, only purchases and sales by the Single Purchaser for the
restricted market and direct sales from a producer to a final
qualified purchaser will fall outside the Market Operator's activ-
ity.
UntilJanuary 1, 2001, the National Transmission Manager is
to handle dispatching, based only on technical and network re-
quirements, i.e., independent of market considerations.27 8 After
January 1, 2001, the Market Operator will assume responsibility
for dispatching based on economic criteria. 279
The Bersani Decree promotes renewable power sources,
namely solar energy, wind, hydroelectricity, geothermal power,
tides, waves, and waste.28 ° To further renewable power sources,
entities responsible for plants that produce more than 100 GWh
annually must, as of the year following January 1, 2001, generate
at least two percent 28 1 of the additional power produced follow-
ing the Bersani Decree's effective date (April 1, 1999) from re-
newable sources or acquire the shortfall from renewable source
producers.282 The National Transmission Manager is to assure
that up to fifteen of the primary energy conduits necessary to
generate Italy's electricity, for electric energy produced by plants
that utilize, in order, renewable energy sources, cogeneration,
and national fuel resources. 283 The Ministry of Industry may
propose incentives for renewable power, which Italy's regions
are then to distribute through appropriate bidding mecha-
276. Id. art. 5.
277. Id.
278. Id. art. 5(2).
279. Id.
280. Id. art. 11.
281. Id. art. 11(5).
282. Id. arts. 11 (1), (2). The Bersani Decree assigns ENEL's rights and obligations
pursuant to Law No. 9 of 1991 power contracts to the National Transmission Manager,
Bersani Decree art. 11(3), and provides that the National Transmission Manager may
sell credits for their power output to the large generators who would otherwise fail to
meet their own requirement to provide renewable resource power proportional to their
incremental increase in renewable power generation. Id.
283. Id.
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nisms.284
The Bersani Decree facilitates development of convention-
ally fueled power plants as follows:
" One stop permitting. It contemplates that the Ministry of
Industry will issue a decree at least coordinating the nu-
merous existing applicable permit procedures.285
* Re-powering. Rebuilding and modernization of existing
plants within existing plant bounds will not require fur-
ther land use approval.286
" Denials. Project rejections are to be communicated to
the European Commission for scrutiny.287
B. Independent Regulatory Commissions and the Electric Sector
The market structure, which the Bersani Decree imposes,
could not have been conceived without the existence of the Au-
thority for Electric Energy and Gas. Specifically, the authority
oversight of the independence of accounting information to jus-
tify tariffs and the setting of tariffs for so-called restricted custom-
ers are functions that the Italian political system would entrust
only to an autonomous body. Without such a body, the Italian
political system would not allow privatization or liberalization to
proceed.288
Competition is brewing in the electric sector. The leading
municipal companies and some of the larger independent
power generators are availing themselves of the new regulatory
framework overseen by'the Authorities. The large municipal
companies, which to this day have survived the 1962 creation of
ENEL, are the Milan, Rome, and Turin electric utilities. Each of
them has been the object of partial privatization efforts that in-
clude listing on the stock exchange.289 Pursuant to the Bersani
Decree, each will consolidate its responsibility for distribution
within its municipal territory.290 Furthermore, each has contem-
284. Id. art. 11(6).
285. Id. art. 8(4)(a).
286. Id.
287. Id. art. 8(5).
288. Law No. 474 of July 30, 1994 (It.), Gazz. Uff. No. 177 (July 30, 1994).
289. See Italy, supra note 69, at 203.
290. Bersani Decree, supra note 43, art. 9(3).
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plated diversification into telecommunications. 291 Recently, the
three companies have contemplated the development of joint
business activity relative to the competitive, unrestricted mar-
ket.29 2 Sondel and Edison, two players in the Italian independ-
ent power market, are also emerging as competitors in the un-
restricted market.
Nonetheless, ENEL remains a formidable market actor,
even if subject to the Bersani Decree-mandated reorganization
and break up. Well in advance of the Bersani Decree, ENEL's
management took action to prepare for a competitive market.
Its current management, appointed in 1996, reduced ENEL em-
ployment seventeen percent from December 1995 through June
1999293 and diversified into telecommunications through its
joint venture with Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom,
known as WIND.2 94 ENEL's management went beyond the ini-
tiatives of increased internal productivity and diversification to
commence restructuring its core activity of electricity genera-
tion.
The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas and the Antitrust
Authority had important roles in assuring that ENEL's restruc-
turing of its core electric business remained consistent with
objectives of competition, that is, that it represented a step to-
wards increased competition rather than mere preservation of
the national electricity monopoly. When ENEL's management
in 1997 preemptively acted to commit 2500 MW of its approxi-
mately 55,000 MW generating capacity to a joint venture with
Italian national oil company ENI, the Antitrust Authority im-
posed the requirement that ENEL ultimately sell its interest in
the joint venture entity.295
On May 5, 1997, ENI and ENEL signed a memorandum of
understanding directed to the creation of the joint venture. 96
291. See e.g., AEM Press Release No. 28, Nov. 9, 1999 (visited on Feb. 13, 2000)
<http;//www.aem.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
292. Italy, supra note 69, at 203; Intesa AEM, ACEA e AEM Torino; Nasce il polo energia
anti-Enel, CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Nov. 16, 1999, at 23.
293. ENEL PROSPECrUS, supra note 12, at 5.
294. Id. at 6.
295. An additional 5000 MW commitment to another joint venture with U.S. in-
dependent power developer ENRON was contemplated and later dropped. Italy, supra
note 69, at 203.
296. ENI and ENEL subsequently parted company. Stefano Tamburello, Eni
Scende in Campo Contro il Colosso Enel, LA REPUBBLICA, Nov. 18, 1999.
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ENI would contribute the cogeneration power plants in its refin-
eries, and ENEL would contribute a number of its power plants.
The memorandum of understanding contemplated that each
party would contribute about 2500 MW of power facilities, which
after re-powering as modem combined cycle gas fired power
plants, might total 8000 to 10,000 MW. The joint venture would
allow ENEL a means to serve about a third of the then contem-
plated future free market for large industrial users. The Author-
ity for Electric Energy and Gas asked the Antitrust Authority on
May 29, 1997 for a formal opinion related to the ENI-ENEL ven-
ture. 97 Its president responded July 29, 1997.298
The principal concerns related to dominance by ENI and
ENEL is about the nascent competitive market for electricity, i.e.,
the market to supply "eligible" customers within the meanings of
the Community Directive No. 92 of 1996 and the Bersani De-
cree, and then in the course of elaboration. The Authority for
Electric Energy and Gas had warned ENEL against the expecta-
tion that any retention of high cost installations would be cov-
ered by tariffs set by the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas,
and it had urged ENI and ENEL to contemplate an auction sale
of their ownership of the joint venture.299 The Antitrust Author-
ity's president looked favorably upon the transfer of existing
ENEL plants to other entities, particularly in view of the time
required for construction of new, independently owned power
plants. Antitrust clearance, however, was conditioned on
ENEL's undertaking to divest its interest with reasonable
promptness.
The Authorities thus channeled ENEL's initial effort to pre-
pare for the coming competitive market. This channeling con-
stituted a first confirmation that the Authorities would work in a
meaningful way to achieve competitive markets.
297. Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Deliberation No. 54 of May 28, 1997 on
the Outcome of the Investigation of the Agreement between ENEL and ENI for the
Constitution of a Joint Company in the Electric Sector (visited on Feb. 12, 2000)
<http://www.autorita.energia.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
298. Antitrust Authority File No. 2590 (visited on Feb. 13, 2000) <http://
www.agcm.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
299. Authority for Electric Energy and Gas Deliberation No. 54 of May 28, 1997,
art. 3(c).
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VI. TELECOM SECTOR
The AGC, CONSOB, and the Antitrust Authority have inter-
acted to create the foundation of a competitive market for tele-
communications in Italy. As for electricity, the position of the
historically dominant government monopoly has been a signifi-
cant factor to address. Different from the case of ENEL, where
the solution is to break it up, the approach to Telecom Italia's
dominant position has been to afford greater' reliance on the
entry of new participants and technologies, combined with the
opening of its national network to competitive market actors.
Whereas in ENEL's case, the Bersani Decree provided for the
neutral organization of the national transmission system by an
independent system operator, the approach to Telecom Italia's
dominance has been its privatization combined with the licens-
ing of new market actors and the regulatory imposition of neu-
tral terms of interconnection. A further difference of the elec-
tric sector is of course that the State ownership of the national
telecommunication monopoly was surrendered without break-
ing up the monopoly entity. The subsequent hostile takeover by
new ownership in conformity with CONSOB rules has further
distanced Telecom Italia from its State-controlled past. In con-
trast and notwithstanding the late 1999 public offering of a sub-
stantial minority of ENEL's shares, State ownership of ENEL is
being surrendered in conjunction with a legislatively mandated
break-up of ENEL.
A. The AGC's Role in Licensing and Interconnection
To satisfy the mandates of Italy's antitrust and implementa-
tion laws, as well as the overarching mandate of Community law,
the AGC has moved promptly on the measures required to con-
front Telecom Italia's de facto monopoly. 00 In 1998, Telecom
Italia had over ninety percent of the Italian fixed-line voice te-
lephony services market. 0 1 One important first step was simply
to authorize a significant number of new market actors.
An AGC license is required to install telecommunication
300. For essays on various aspects of Italian telecommunications law, see LA Dis-
CIPLINA GIURIDICA DELLE TELECOMUNICAZIONI (Franco Bonelli & Sabino Cassese, eds.
1999) [hereinafter LA DISCIPLINA GiUPJDICA].
301. Law No. 249 of July 31, 1997, art. 4(7), (It.), supp. ord. no. 154/L to Gazz.
Uff. No. 177 (July 31, 1997).
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networks that use ground lines or terrestrial frequencies."°2 Op-
erating telecommunication networks and supplying telecommu-
nication services are subject to AGC licenses and authoriza-
tions. o  The installation of telecommunication networks on
public assets, such as city streets, is subject to the issuance of mu-
nicipal concessions for the use of public land, and is awarded on
a nondiscriminatory basis among the various applicants. Munici-
palities are allowed to impose obligations of a civic nature in
connection with award of such concessions in conformity with
the AGC's rules. The installation of backbone networks is sub-
ject exclusively to AGC licensing." 4
In its brief existence, the AGC has sequentially issued four
competitively-bid licenses for mobile telephony (held by
Telecom Italia Mobile, Omnitel Pronto Italia, WIND, and Blutel,
a joint venture principally of Autostrade S.p.A., and British
Telecom) and has authorized on the order of seventy operators
for fixed-line voice telephony.305 For these new entrants, a pre-
mium was placed on interconnection terms and, to a lesser de-
gree, on the use of the limited long distance networks not held
by Telecom Italia.306
Community law requires that national authorities imple-
ment its principle of assuring the appropriate terms of intercon-
nection between telecommunication operators.30 7 Italian law
302. Id. art. 4(1).
303. Id. art. 4(2).
304. Id. art. 4(3).
305. A list of licenses, updated on November 24, 1999, is available on the AGC
website, which is <http://www.agcm.it>.
306. Telecom Italia's main competitors in the fixed-line market are Albacom, Colt,
Infostrada, MCI Worldcom, WIND, and Tiscali. ENEL PRosPEcTus, supra note 12, at
79. Several of these competitors were established as consortia of majority Italian inter-
ests with non-Italian telecom companies, which were formed to attempt to exploit for
purposes of building ground based telephone networks the limited number of existing
restricted use networks. The consortia include:
" INFOSTRADA (established by Olivetti and Mannesmann, but now exclusively
owned by Mannesmann) starting with the state railroad's long distance net-
work.
" WIND (established by ENEL as a 51% holder with France Telecom and
Deutsche Telecom) starting with ENEL's long distance network.
" ALBACOM (established among among British Telecom, Mediaset and Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro with an Italian majority), starting with oil company ENI's
long distance network.
307. Parliament and Council Directive No. 97/33, art. 9(3), O.J. L 199/32, at 40
(1997).
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implements this principle through a combination of statute, de-
cree, and AGC action. 0 8 The essential concept is that the net-
works of every operator be open on demand to all others. An
operator who wishes to interconnect with another must attempt
to negotiate the terms of interconnection, and the counterparty
is obligated to reach an agreement to provide the interconnec-
tion within regulatorily specified parameters.0 9 Should the par-
ties be unable to agree promptly on the terms of interconnec-
tion, the AGC, in conformity with Community law, has the power
to intervene to mandate the terms of interconnection. 10
In the early days of Italy's competitive framework, Telecom
Italia felt strongly enough about these matters to challenge,"1 '
without ultimate success, the Communications Ministry Decree
of April 23, 1998 that contemplated the implementation of
mandatory interconnection negotiation.312 As an operator with
dominant market power, Telecom Italia is required to develop a
"reference interconnection offer" even prior to any specific re-
quest from another market actor to negotiate interconnection
terms. 313
By mandating that Italian voice telephone operators, partic-
ularly Telecom Italia, provide interconnection on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis, including individual services, 1 4 Decree No. 318 of
1997 opened the Italian voice telephony market to new entrants.
308. Presidential Decree No. 318 of September 19, 1997 (It.), arts. 4(1), (5), supp.
ord. to Gazz. Uff. No. 221 (Sept. 22, 1997); Communications Ministry Decree of April
23, 1998, art. 3, Gazz. Uff. No. 133 (June 6, 1998), in LA DISCIPLINA GIURDiCA, supra
note 300, at 931.
309. Law No. 249 of 1997 (It.), arts. 1(6)(a)(7), (8), (9), supp. ord. No. 154/L to
Gazz. Uff. No. 177 (July 31, 1997), further confirmed by, Presidential Decree No. 318 of
1997, arts. 4, 5.
310. Principles which interconnection is to respect include:
* promotion of competition among the networks and services,
* guarantee of interconnection to serve local, national, and European Union
markets,
* guarantee of communication among user terminals where compatible,
* non discrimination, and
" proportionality of rights and obligations among operators and suppliers.
Law No. 249 of 1997, art. 5(1).
311. Elisabetta Diamanti, Accesso e Interconnessione alle Reti di Telecomunicazioni, in LA
DISCIPLINA GIURIDICA, supra note 300, at 181, 192-93.
312. Communications Ministry Decree of April 23, 1998 (It.), Gazz Uff. No. 133
(June 6, 1998), LA DXSCIPLINA GIUDItCA, supra note 300, at 931.
313. Presidential Decree No. 318 of 1997, art. 4(9).
314. Id. art. 6,
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The only limitations to a new market participant's abilities to
force Telecom Italia to provide interconnection are if "practica-
ble alternatives" from the technical/commercial standpoint to
the requested interconnection exist, and if the new participant
lacks adequate resources to exploit the interconnection.3 1 5
AGC's temporary discretion to disallow interconnection based
on these narrow limitations is unlikely to be exercised on parti-
san political terms in view of the mechanisms to isolate the AGC
from political concerns.3 16 All interconnection agreements are
to be notified to the AGC. i t Among the significant points re-
lated to interconnection-which remain subject to further
evolution-is the accounting methodology to be used to set the
price of interconnection. The ultimate goal is to move from a
methodology based on historical cost of the relevant infrastruc-
ture to a methodology based on prospective incremental costs
arising from the provision of interconnection.A'
In an eighteen month period following the AGC's institu-
tion, Telecom Italia issued three reference interconnection of-
fers, which progressively approached an acceptable foundation
for a competitive market. Actions of the Antitrust Authority and
of the AGC's Commission for Infrastructures and Networks
shaped this progress. Relative to the first offer made July 1,
1997,' 19 the Antitrust Authority issued a broadly critical decision
February 3, 1998.320 Relative to the second offer made July 25,
1998,321 the AGC's Commission on Infrastructures and Networks
issued a strongly critical decision on November 25, 1998.22
Telecom Italia sought an injunction against this decision from
the Lazio regional administrative tribunal, which denied relief
December 16, 1998.323 Telecom Italia then issued a revised offer
315. Id. art. 4(4).
316. Id. art. 41(4), 19(3),
317. Id. art. 4(17).
318. Id. art. 7(3) (effectively postponing question until year 2000).
319. See AGCM, Segnalazione del 13 Febbraio 1998 sull'offerta di Interconnessione di
Riferimento della Societd Telecom Italia, in LA DIsCIPUiNA GIURIDICA, supra note 300, at 1023.
320. See Gazz. Uff. No. 133 (June 10, 1998).
321. See AGC Deliberation No. 1/CIR/98 (visited on Feb. 12, 2000) <http://
www.agcom.it> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
322. Id.
323. See Lazio Regional Administrative Tribunal Order Denying Telecom Italia
S.p.A.'s Request for Suspension, Dec. 16, 1998 in LA DISCIPLINA GIumRcA, supra note
300, at 1087.
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December 31, 1998.324
B. Olivetti's Takeover of Telecom Italia
Olivetti's successful hostile takeover of Telecom Italia is a
landmark event that the framework of Authorities described in
this Article facilitated. Olivetti was a much smaller company
than Telecom Italia, and it used borrowed money to back its bid.
In addition to sweeping aside Telecom Italia's management, the
takeover had some significant tangential impact on the composi-
tion of the players in Italy's telecommunication market. Namely,
Olivetti sold its stake in Infostrada to its German partner Man-
nesman. Also, Telecom Italia's collaboration with Deutsche
Telekom in an unsuccessful attempt to frustrate the takeover has
meant that Deutsche Telekom's partners in the WIND consor-
tium, ENEL and France Telecom, are engaged in litigation with
Deutsche Telekom. The thrust of this litigation is that Deutsche
Telekom breached its obligations to its WIND partners. 25 Be-
hind these developments, three elements of the new environ-
ment in Italy were particularly germane to the Telecom Italia
takeover battle. CONSOB enforced a philosophy of one share,
one vote. The Treasury Ministry forbore from exercising its
golden share rights. Further, the AGC had provided a market
framework by sufficient licensing and authorization activity and
by mandating interconnection terms so that the AGC and the
Antitrust Authority could look benignly on the corporate control
battle.
The acquisition battle by Olivetti for Telecom Italia formally
began February 26, 1999 with a public notice pursuant to CON-
SOB rules. 26 This communication stated Olivetti's offer to buy
all of the ordinary shares of Telecom Italia with a combination of
324. Davide d'Angelo, La Disaggregazione dee Condizioni Economiche nei Servizi di In-
terconnessione, in LA DISCIPLINA GIURIDICA, supra note 300, at 205, n.23, 212, n.36.
325. ENEL PROSPECTUS, supra note 12, at 5, 14, 79. In July 1999, ENEL and France
Telecom commenced an ICC arbitration proceeding in Geneva against Deutsche
Telekom seeking the right to buy out Deutsche Telekom's interest in WIND and Lit 1
for 1700 billion lire in damages on the ground that Deutsche Telekom had violated
exclusivity, confidentiality, and non-competition provisions of the WIND shareholder
agreement by signing a business combination agreement with Telecom Italia. Litiga-
tion is also pending in the Italian courts relative to the termination by the WIND share-
holders, other than Deutsche Telekom, of the Deutsche Telekom WIND directors.
326. Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998, art. 102 (It.), supp. ord. No.
52/L to Gazz. Uff. No. 71 (Mar. 26, 1998).
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cash and securities issued by an Olivetti shell company, Tecnost
International, B.V.3 2' That the offer was highly leveraged with
debt was criticized as contrary to the spirit of Italian law.121 As
expected, on April 27, 1999, the board of Telecom Italia rejected
the offer as too low and too risky because of its leveraged na-
ture.3 29 Telecom Italia's management sought shareholder ap-
proval for a defensive merger with Deutsche Telecom as a white
knight.
But the market, and Telecom Italia's 3.9% shareholder, the
Italian Treasury, reacted otherwise. On May 30, 1999, Telecom
Italia's shareholders accepted a sweetened Olivetti offer, and the
Italian Treasury Ministry, as holder of a golden share in
Telecom, abstained from exercising its veto power. The Olivetti
takeover demonstrates a significant increase in the level of mar-
ket discipline to which publicly traded Italian companies are
now subject.
In September 1999, a transaction was proposed whereby
Telecom Italia would be merged into the Tecnost shell holding
company, with the result that the merged company could be put
into play as a merger or acquisition candidate beyond the appli-
cability of CONSOB rules. The proposal provoked fierce opposi-
tion, and the Italian Treasury Ministry threatened to use its
golden share to torpedo the restructuring."' 0 Eventually, it was
the market that rejected the proposed merger of Telecom and
Tecnost. When the Tecnost and Telecom stock prices fell
sharply, the restructuring was abandoned.3 ' Most significantly,
the Treasury did not exercise its golden share rights and the
327. Official communication under Article 102 of Legislative Decree No. 58 pub-
lished in Data Bank of I1 Sole 24 Ore February 26, 1999; ID No. SS990226002FAA
("CONSOB Notice"). CONSOB Notice, part 2.
328. See Riccardo Sabbatini, Quella di Olivetti i un'offerta Anomala, IL SOLE 24 ORE,
Mar. 11, 1999, at 3. Civil Code Section 2358 states in relevant part: "A company cannot
make loans or provide guarantees for the purchase or subscription of its shares. A
company cannot, including by way of a fiduciary, or through third party intermediaries,
accept its shares as a guarantee." Tecnost's borrowing to fund its hostile tender offer
and pledging its own stock as collateral does not fall squarely within the prohibition.
329. For a brief review of the Telecom board reaction to Olivetti's offer, see Orazio
Carabini, Telecom: Furnata Nera Sulla Fusione, IL SOLE 24 ORE, Apr. 20, 1999, at 3.
330. Rossella Bocciarelli, Amato a Telecom: Tutto da fifare-Una settimana sempre nella
bufera, IL SOLE 24 ORE, Feb. 10, 1999, at 25.
331. See Telecom: Retromarcia di Colannino, CORMiERE DELLA SERA, Nov. 22, 1999, at
9. More recently, Telecom Italia turned its attention to the Internet. See, e.g., Seat-
Tin. It, insieme entre luglio, CORRMERE DELLA SERA, Feb. 18, 2000, at 26.
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markets created within the framework of the Authorities were
confirmed as Telecom's ultimate regulators.
VII. ITALY'S INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS'
JOINING THE COURTS AS LEADING INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY LAW
Italy, unified in 1861, is a young country. Its constitution,
adopted in 1948, is even younger. At the same time, Italy's an-
cient and heterogeneous cultural roots continue to influence its
public life. 32 Several strands of Italy's political history combined
to produce the initial confrontational approach of its Constitu-
tional Court to Community law and the subsequent evolution of
Italy's response to include the creation of its new independent
regulatory commissions and their embrace of Community initia-
tives to promote competitive markets.
Italy's 1948 constitution reflects a determination never to
repeat the experience of fascism, which led to war, repression,
and defeat. That constitution's emphasis on proportionality in
elections13 3 led to coalition governments. Individually, these
governments were short lived, but their basic structure was ex-
traordinarily stable over decades. With time, they became associ-
ated with the infiltration of party patronage into all facets of na-
tional life. The party patronage associated with the State control
of ENEL and Telecom Italia, and other State-held entities, for an
extended period made contemplation of their privatization, and
even their management on principles of economic efficiency,
difficult to contemplate. It ultimately, however, led to a cres-
cendo of misconduct, which helped to create willingness to re-
form.
Italy's unification was accomplished under the leadership of
the Piemontese who brought with them principles of French ad-
ministrative law and organization.3 4 Unlike France, Italy, how-
ever, did not develop a culture of prestigious grandes icoles for
the formation of national elites of civil servants."3 5 Although It-
aly has many dedicated and competent civil servants, its public
332. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 17-62 (1993).
333. COST. art. 56 (It.).
334. SABINO CASSESE, LE AMMINISTRAZIONI PUBBLICHE IN EUROPA: PER UNO STUDIO
STORICO COMPARATO DEL DIRuTro AMMINISTRATIVO (1994).
335. PIERRE BIRNBAUM, THE HEIGHTS OF POWER: AN ESSAY ON THE POWER ELITE IN
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administration has not had the reputation of dynamisme or effi-
ciency, which the French public administration claims. As Euro-
pean Community initiatives in favor of Community-wide compet-
itive markets became more pressing on Italy, this factor militated
against reliance upon the traditional public administrative struc-
tures as the regulators of newly competitive markets.
Italy's government structure, comprised of Council of Minis-
ters and its president, also popularly known as the Prime Minis-
ter, depends on the confidence of the two houses of parliament
for its tenure in office.33 6 The ministers responsible for the vari-
ous portfolios, including the Minister of Industry responsible for
electricity and the Minister of Communications responsible for
telecommunications, are politically responsible as part of the
government. Should the government to which they belong lose
the confidence of parliament, they lose office. Notwithstanding
the amazing long term post-war stability of the Italian political
class, the constant changing of actual governments and hence of
responsible ministers contributed to creating a basis for seeking
stability through some alternative institutional mechanism, such
as the Authorities.
The Authorities discussed here that regulate securities, anti-
trust, electric power, and telecommunications are novel institu-
tions for Italy. They fall outside the models of Italy's French in-
fluenced public administration and its parliamentary govern-
mental structure. What they perhaps most resemble is Italy's
Austrian-inspired Constitutional Court."3 7 Italy's Constitutional
Court is conceived as simultaneously a judicial and a legislative
body. Its membership is accordingly selected in equal thirds by
parliament, the judiciary, and the president.338 The Constitu-
tional Court's status as the sole body that undertakes constitu-
tional review is further confirmation of this point.339 Like the
FRANCE (1982); EzRA N. SULEIMAN, POLITICS, POWER AND BUREAUCRACY IN FRANCE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE (1974).
336. COST. art. 94 (It.).
337. See HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 1940-41 (1942); MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS, A COMPARA-
TIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
338. COST. art. 135 (It.).
339. Id. art. 134. Individual litigants do not have direct access to the Constitu-
tional Court. Questions of constitutionality are referred to the Constitutional Court by
any Italian court which believes such a question is raised in pending litigation. Re-
cently, the European Court for Human Rights confirmed that a litigant seeking redress
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Constitutional Court, the Authorities have both legislative and
judicial attributes. The Authorities are certainly insulated from
direct political accountability, but they are subject to administra-
tive judicial review of their application of the legislatively man-
dated criteria for their action. Like Italian magistrates, the mem-
bers of the Authorities are required to be impartial, but unlike
magistrates, the members of the Authorities are directed to
make and implement policy within the mandate of the gov-
erning legislation, reminiscent of the Constitutional Court's sub-
jection to the constitution.
A cozy world of State ownership, monopolies, government
regulated and allocated credit, and foreign exchange controls
coincided with an assertion that EC law only mattered in Italy if
Italy found it convenient to recognize such law. This early 1960s
sketch maintains little resonance today. Today, the liberalizing
economic principles of EC law are embraced as consistent with
the fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional system.
And, the institutions to implement them have been invented in
ways intended to isolate them from whatever remnants of the
past continue to persist. In each of the electric power and tele-
communication sectors in Italy, the weight of past monopolies
continues to influence heavily the evolution of the relevant mar-
kets. Neither ENEL nor Telecom Italia is likely to disappear.
Just as AT&T has evolved in the U.S. markets into something-
or indeed a multiplicity of somethings-hard to have imagined
in the old days, each of ENEL and Telecom Italia has already
begun to mutate in ways that a decade ago would have been
quite unforeseeable.
The creation of new Italian enterprises, and the entry of
competing foreign enterprises and foreign resources of money
and human capital will doubtlessly proceed with many bumps
along the way. Already the discipline of market competition is
changing the behavior of all players in ways consistent with the
of a breach of its fundamental rights was left without recourse under Italian law when
the ordinary Italian courts declined to recognize its claim and to pose any question to
the Italian Constitutional Court. The litigant was a corporate owner of many rental
properties who complained that Italian authorities violated its property rights by giving
precedence to small property owners in completing eviction proceedings. Immobiliare
Saffi v. Italy, Application No. 22774/93, July 28, 1999 (not yet published in Reports of
Judgments & Decisions) (visited on Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judg-
ments.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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demand for greater efficiency and service.3 4 ° The Authorities
guard market order and, as such, are the institutions that allow
the reform of these sectors to proceed. The Authorities exist
with their present mandate because of the stimulus of the EC
Directives mandating liberalization and the pressure for eco-
nomic efficiency generated by the European Community's single
internal market policies as a whole. The opening of Italy to com-
petitive forces from the rest of the Community reinforces the
basis for the Authorities' work toward achieving greater competi-
tive efficiency. In the context of this environment, the Authori-
ties have joined the judiciary as key agents for implementing and
assuring the benefits of Community law and policies in favor of
competitive markets. The institution of the Authorities has
ushered into being a new dimension in how Italian and Commu-
nity law relate to each other.
340. See Thomas Kamm, Continental Drift: Europe Marks a Year of Serious Flirtation
with the Free Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1999, at Al.
